611 
height of the Vietnam war to about 55,000 in 1975.'** The decline 
in job opportunities is also evident from data concerning the average 
age of seagoing employees. In 1972, the median age of licensed deck 
and engine officers was 47.1 and 48.0 years, respectively. The com- 
parable figures for unlicensed deck and engine workers were 45.1 
and 46.3 years.° This high average age is a direct consequence 
of the limited opportunities for new entrants. One Federal, 6 State- 
supported, and 2 union schools graduated about 760 new licensed 
officers in 1975. During the same period, the Soviet Union trained 
about 5,000 full-time and 4,000 part-time officers.!°* The United States 
has 4 relatively old merchant marine training ships available for officer 
training schools; the Soviet Union has 22 such ships plus 12 additional 
fisheries training ships.'°’ 
In view of the uncertainty in seagoing employment, the output of 
licensed officers has been projected to fall short of demand by the 
end of the decade.'** The United States may have to act to halt 
the continued decline in job opportunities and to provide better 
long-range employment prospects in the merchant marine in order 
to create sufficient incentives for young people to enter a career 
as merchant marine officers. The depressed state of the U.S. merchant 
marine has had a negative effect on ship construction capacity. A 
study by the Commission on American Shipbuilding concluded that 
the U.S. shipbuilding industry had, at maximum, only one-third of 
the required output capacity necessary in case of a sustained con- 
flict,15? 
The industry suffers from a low level of profits and, consequently, 
it iS not attractive to investors. It has problems attracting skilled 
personnel, even at a time of high nationwide unemployment rates. 
The industry also suffers from very long delivery times for specialized 
tools.'© 
Without a subsidized maritime program, the United States could 
anticipate significant shortfalls in essential military deliveries in war- 
time. The American shipbuilding mobilization base would diminish, 
and the Nation would be much more heavily dependent on foreign 
flag shipping of undemonstrated reliability for the wartime movement 
of essential imports. The United States would also be vulnerable to 
prejudicial rate discrimination and perhaps also to political pressures; 
the U.S. balance of payments deficit could be increased significantly; 
and employment opportunities would be reduced.'®' In view of the 
rapidly shrinking size of the Navy, any further decline of the merchant 
marine would reduce the U.S. presence in the Third World to occa- 
sional port calls. The sheer size of the Soviet civilian (fishing, 
merchant marine, oceanographic) and naval fleet, and their continuous 
presence in the Third World, create an impression of overwhelming 
soviet power. The U.S. merchant marine, which does not serve a 
184 Hearings on Merchant Marine Oversight 1975, op. cit.; pp. 31 and 384. The Soviet merchant 
marine employs about 90,000 people in seagoing positions. See table 7. 
‘55 Tbid., p. 384. 
156 [bid., p. 384, and table. 
187Information received from Naval Intelligence Service of the Department of Defense, August 
1976. 
1588 Hearings on Merchant Marine Oversight 1975, op. cit., p. 380. 
158 Transportation Institute, op. cit., p. 9-1. 
'S9Ibid., p. 9-2. 
161 [bid., p. 389. 
