621 
They have done this organizationally by centrally directing and coor- 
dinating ocean policy at the highest levels of government and the 
Communist Party. 
The various elements of U.S. seapower, by contrast, do not interact 
or do not interact sufficiently. The U.S. merchant marine has about 
the same tonnage as the Soviet merchant fleet but much of it is 
too specialized to be useful to the Navy in case of conflict. Tankers 
are not built with a secondary, naval auxiliary function in mind. They 
could be, according to Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, but there has been 
too much executive branch dissension to get merchant ships built 
that way.'® The scattering of responsibility for ocean affairs among 
numerous agencies, which apply parochial pressure on Congress, 
prevents the United States from reaching the total maritime strength 
of which it is capable.'* 
U.S. citizens own a large fleet of merchantmen sailing under foreign 
flags of convenience, primarily Panamanian and Liberian flags. It is 
doubtful whether this fleet would be available to the United States 
in time of war. The ships are primarily manned by foreign officers 
and sailors who owe no allegiance to the United States. No one 
knows how these officers and sailors would act if the flag-state na- 
tionalized the fleet or what the United States would do in such an 
event. 
Unlike their Soviet counterparts, U.S. merchant marine ships and 
private oceanographic research vessels do not serve a dual civilian 
and military role. Without judging desirability, such a dual role clearly 
enhances Soviet seapower. , 
The rapid buildup of Soviet seapower raises many questions about 
Soviet intentions and the implications of Soviet maritime expansion 
on U.S. national security and on U.S. economic well-being. The follow- 
ing should be considered: 
First. The Soviet Union may have developed a navy uniquely 
designed to interfere with U.S. Navy sea control and power projection 
missions in the North Atlantic and North Pacific oceans. The Chief 
of Naval Operations maintains that the Soviet Navy could very well 
succeed in achieving its sea denial mission in the foreseeable future. 
‘Many critics of naval policy argue that the Soviet Union already 
has the capacity to deny U. S. sea control and power projection 
in the North Atlantic and North Pacific. 
If the Chief of Naval Operations and his critics are right, the U.S. 
Navy faces, or is about to face, the most serious challenge in its 
existence. There are no easy solutions. Some experts suggest that 
a larger balanced Navy is all the Nation needs to meet the Soviet 
naval threat. Critics, on the other hand, maintain that a different 
Navy is needed to meet the new challenges. The critics differ among 
themselves as to the recommended composition of such a new Navy. 
Advanced technology with respect to ship construction, propulsion 
systems, deadly guided missiles on small as well as large platforms, 
orbital surveillance satellites revolutionizing detection of surface ves- 
185 Zumwalt, ‘““‘High-Low”’, op. cit., p. 4. 
186 Ibid., p. 4. 
