622 
sels, and ASW systems in the air or attached to surface ships or 
the sea floor, have dramatically changed naval warfare. While naval 
experts may disagree as to the composition of the fleet of the future, 
all agree on the need to maintain technological superiority. 
Second. The Soviet Navy is an instrument for the promotion of 
world revolution and the extension of Soviet influence in the third 
world. In a recent article in the Naval War College Review, Dr. 
Uri Ra’anan, professor of international politics and chairman of the 
international security studies program at the Fletcher School of Law 
and Diplomacy, gave an interesting analysis of the use of the Soviet 
Navy in project power in third world countries. In contrast to those 
Western analysts who argue that the recent Soviet naval build-up 
was still basically an extension of the Defense of the Motherland 
concept, Professor Ra’anan maintains that as early as 1967 there 
were indications that Soviet naval strategy was moving from a primar- 
ily coastal defense strategy to a concept of power projection into 
the third world, primarily the Middle East and the approaches to 
the Indian Ocean.?®" 
The new role of the Soviet Navy in peacetime has been described 
in recent years in numerous Soviet publications and speeches. In an 
article in Morskoy Sbornik in 1972, which appears to be representative 
of Soviet thinking on this subject, Admiral of the Soviet Navy S. 
G. Gorshkov defined that role as follows: 
* * * to vividly demonstrate the economic and military power of a country beyond 
its borders * * * to show readiness for decisive actions, to deter or suppress the 
intentions of potential enemies, as well as to support friendly states. * * * to surprise 
probable enemies with the perfection of the equipment being exhibited, to affect their 
morale, to intimidate them right up to the outbreak of the war, and to suggest to 
them in advance the hopelessness of fighting. * * * (this) in many cases has permitted 
the achievement of political goals without resorting to military operations by only 
threatening to initiate them.'*8 
This policy of intervention in third world countries, preferably with 
the assistance of client states (like Cuba), is in line with the Soviet 
concept of détente. It is frequently referred to in the Soviet literature 
as preventing the export of counterrevolution. !®% 
According to Professor Ra’anan, international conflict between main 
adversaries . . . merely has to be fought out in slightly different ways 
and in slightly different arenas; in other words, preferably in the 
third world rather than in Europe, and, if possible, by paramilitary 
means, including Soviet logistical aid and the utilization of Communist 
friends, like the Cubans, the North Vietnamese, and the North Kore- 
ans, rather than by direct and overt use of Soviet troops.1® 
A growing number of defense analysts tend to agree with Ra’anan 
that in Angola-like conflicts the Soviets may interpose their comba- 
'87 Uri Ra’anan, “‘The Soviet View of Navies in Peacetime”, Naval War College Review, vol. XXIX, 
No. 260, summer 1976, p. 34. 
88 Quoted from: Uri Ra’anan, “‘The Soviet View of Navies in Peacetime”’, op. cit., p. 34. 
189 Ibid., p. 35. 
See also: Paul H. Nitze, ‘Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente’’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 
54, No. 2, January 1976, pp. 208-210. 
™° Ibid., p. 37 
