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Defense that by avoiding one “emergency” on land we create another 
long-range, and equally insidious, emergency in the world’s great seas. 
Perhaps it might be argued that the two most recent dumpings—in- 
volving nerve gas and munitions—should be forgotten, and we should 
simply look to the future. I would submit, however, that the only way 
we can look to the future is by recalling with precision the events of 
recent days to be certain that we reject the premises of the policy be- 
hind these recent disposal operations. It would appear to me that the 
“policy” of the military has been to regard the oceans as a convenient 
container in which to put unwanted items—and what is worse, they 
have not reserved the oceans as the container of last resort, but rather 
have chosen the sea whenever a self-proclaimed “emergency” arises. 
T would submit that if we substitute the phrase “lack of planning” for 
“emergency” a truer picture emerges. 
In recent months the Navy has loaded a ship with nerve gas, placed 
location transmitters and gas detectors aboard, and scuttled the ship. 
Now. it lies somewhere on the bottom of the ocean, but no one knows 
exactly where, because the transmitters failed. It may be discharging 
its gas into the ocean—but no one knows because the detectors have 
similarly malfunctioned. Also, in recent months, the Navy came close 
to dumping tons of munitions on a previously dumped cache of mus- 
tard gas. At the last minute a possible disaster was averted when some- 
one suggested that the great depths might cause these munitions to 
explode—as they subsequently did—and discharge the mustard gas— 
as they might have if the site had not been altered. Frighteningly 
enough, Mr. Chairman, these events took place within days of one an- 
other. and, yet. there is no evidence to suggest that we learned any- 
thing from either one of these occurrences. Indeed, the military did 
not even connect the outcry concerning the nerve gas—even though 
they had been through the Federal courts only days before—with the 
possible dangers of dumping munitions on mustard gas. 
Yet, it is clear that the military is not solely at fault in these m- 
stances. The Executive and the Congress must share the blame equally. 
We have, in our quest for more firepower, more retaliatory force, more 
weapons of terror, chosen to rush ahead with development—and, yes, 
with deployment——of these weapons without giving sufficient thought 
to what is to be done when we discover, at some later date, that the 
weapons no longer have a useful purpose. We have given neither direc- 
tion nor instruction about the importance of being able to safely de- 
stroy that which we have asked the military to create; and, therefore, 
they choose the easiest, most convenient, and least expensive method of 
disposal, we are in a poor position to object. We must turn the corner, 
Mr. Chairman, and face our responsibility head on, for our streams, 
rivers, bays, and oceans can ill-afford more delay on our part. 
We must, in short, gear our military hardware retention and acquisi- 
tion programs to the need for eventual disposal of their products, and 
we must devise specific plans on how to dispose of those weapons which 
we currently have in our arsenal or are developing experimentally. We 
must also demand, as a condition precedent to the authorization of any 
additional weaponry, that specific nd detailed plans are available for 
the disposition of those new weapons. Part of the responsibility for 
such legislation lies within the jurisdiction of this subcommittee, and 
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