74, 
entire process rests exclusively on the first act. Such an argument 
would assert that the second act is only permitted on land acquired 
by government, because blight is being removed, but if there were no 
blight the acquisition would not have been permitted im the first 
place. However, an equally compelling argument can be made against 
this position by resorting briefly to the following hyperbole: Would 
the entire process be considered a public purpose if the blighted 
development were replaced by another blighted development? The 
answer clearly is ‘‘No.’”’ According to the logic of this argument, 
the second act must also constitute (at least to some degree) a public 
purpose even though it is, in most cases, an essentially private use. 
In summary, there are two significant points to be made about 
the urban renewal cases as they relate to new community develop- 
ment: (1) there is a present act which is public (that is, the removal of 
blight) and there is a second act which is also public (that is, new 
development on the previously blighted land); (2), the proposed 
use for the land is a future use in that it does not occur immediately 
and often is postponed indefinitely. 
How future is future? How necessary is necessary? 
As mentioned earlier, there have been no cases in which acquisition 
of unblighted land was permitted where the proposed use was essen- 
tially private. In those cases where the proposed uses are clearly public, 
and not private, the permissibility of the acquisition is determined by 
the “specificity” and the ‘necessity’ of the use.” Some courts, for 
example, have disallowed acquisition of property that was to be used 
for such clear public uses as schools. In one case, a period of 30 years 
was held to be too long to show that the proposed school was 
necessary.” 
However, in nearly all of these cases of this type, their dispositions 
seem to rest, in large part, on the question of whether the Government 
is conducting itself in a manner that is competitive with private inter- 
est. John Dyckman captured the essence of this isssue when he ob- 
served: 
One is prompted to speculate that urban clearance powers are granted to. 
governments largely because their exercise is not profitable for those governments. 
And the acquisition of suburban land for possible sale to future developers is 
frowned upon because it is too profitable to leave to government.” 
The courts in Massachusetts, like those in many other States, have 
labelled this kind of proposed involvement as dealing in “‘real estate’, 
and they have made it clear that real estate is not a permissible actiy- 
ity for the State government. The leading case for this position was. 
decided in 1913 when the supreme judicial court rules that a statute 
Was unconstitutional because it allowed a public corporation to buy 
Jand and then later sell it for a profit.” 
Although the Salisbury decision does not sound encouraging, in it 
the court made a series of observations that offer some promise to the 
current issue of Government land acquisition for new communities. 
74 See note 107, supra. 
%® The Board of Education of the City of Grand Rapids v. Baczewski, 340 Mich. 265, 65 N.W. 2d. 810 (1954). 
76 Dyckman, “Housing in California,” op. cit., p. 322. ; 
7 Salisbury Land Improvement Co. v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 215 Mass. 371, 102 N.E. 619 (1913). 
See also “In re Opinion of the Justices,” 91 N.E. 578 (1910). 
