89 
municipalities. Assuming that the decision has been made not to 
confine new communities dogmatically within the borders of a single 
municipality, one is faced with a choice among a set of alternatives 
whose value must be assessed by balancing political feasibility against 
developmental needs. 
(For purposes of the following discussion, the contiguous municipal 
corporations will be designated A and B respectively, and the over- 
lapping new community site will be designated C.) 
2. Alternative approach to dealing with local government in the develop- 
ment of new communities 
Inaction 
The least politically controversial alternative available is to do 
nothing, to allow, under section 35 of the proposed statute, the return 
to the control of municipalities A and B those portions of C falling 
within their respective boundaries.”° Because Massachusetts contains 
no unincorporated territory, at no time will this laissez faire approach 
leave part of a completed new community outside the protection of 
some local governmental unit. 
This very fact creates problems, however, from a planning point 
of view. Among the reasons for emphasizing in the legislation develop- 
ment of large communities was the desire to attract inhabitants from 
all income levels, to accommodate commercial, industrial, and recrea- 
tional, as well as residential, development, and to take advantage of the 
economies of scale inherent in their construction. To plan such a com- 
munity with the foreknowledge that part of it would return to one 
municipality, the remainder to another, would require the wisdom— 
and good fortune—of a Solomon. Municipality A would not sit idly 
by while the plan called for all the more valuable industrial or other 
development to fall within municipality B. Nor, for example, would A 
wish to include the greater part of the low income housing within its 
borders, while luxury dwellings happened to fall in B. On the other 
hand, the need to duplicate construction within A and B likely would 
destroy the optimum community plan, undermine the anticipated 
economies of scale, and serve as a disincentive to investment from 
private developers.’*° 
Irrespective of the problems of planning and development, the ul- 
timate problem of governing C is itself adequate cause for rejection of 
this laissez faire alternative. A Berne might bisect C along 
physically understandable but politically incomprehensible lines, creat- 
ing arbitarily separate units of government, a functional entity that 
will be developing, as it grows in size, needs and interests increasingly 
peculiar to itself and apart from those of A and B. 
Even if one were to draw the dubious conclusion from these facts 
that the utter simplicity of seeking no boundary adjustment outweighs 
the developmental needs of the new community, municipalities A and 
B, as a practical matter, still would have to effectuate some rather 
122 The discussion will not consider the situation in which the development corporation finds it unneces= 
sary to supersede any of the powers of municipalities A and B at any time during the development process. 
No private developer could possibly be attracted in such a situation not only because of the absence of 
control but also because the external control over his unified plan is under the control of two separate units. 
130 The inability to present a unified plan that would avoid uneconomic duplication would probably be 
sufficient to deter private investment. A further disincentive, however, is the likelihood that such an ineffi- 
cient plan would not qualify for various governmental programs intended to attract private new com- 
ay investment—specifically the New Communities Act of 1968, Public Law No. 90-448, title IV, 82 
tat. 514. 
