90 
extensive programs of cooperation to govern the new community prop- 
erly. Elements of a cooperative program might include simple informal 
acreements or more formal intermunicipal contracts." The possibility 
of adopting either or both of these elements constitutes the second 
alternative for dealing with the boundary problems created by an 
overlapping new community. 
Intermunicipal cooperation 
Presumably the healthy growth of the new community, by contrib- 
uting to the prosperity of both municipalities A and B, will provide an 
incentive for them to enter into voluntary agreements. Despite any 
incentive, however, the agreements probably should be formalized, 
not only to provide greater assurance that the service or function will 
be continued, but also, as a matter of sound planning, to clarify just 
what the service or function is and how it will be provided. 
For the purpose of providing basic services to the new community, 
interlocal contracts are potentially effective.!’ As an alternative form 
of metropolitan government, a regime of intergovernmental agree- 
ments also has the advantage of lowering the unit costs of providing a 
setvice, of not interfering with citizen control and participation, and 
of consequent political feasibility.¥* 
Yet the very voluntarism of these agreements creates offsetting 
disadvantages, especially where, as seems likely in Massachusetts, 
municipality A is a relatively large city and municipality B is a more 
rural town or small city. In that situation, the bargaining power of 
the two municipalities would be unequal and the ability to provide 
needed services would lie almost exclusively with A. A consequently 
could choose either to exact high rates for the services, or to ignore B’s 
requests for cooperation. Furthermore, because the new community 
probably was located as it was in order to relieve urban center A from 
the excessive demands already being made on its services by its core 
city population, A might not be in a position to provide the needed 
services in the first place. 
Another weakness created by the voluntarism of intermunicipal 
agreements to provide services is that— 
(T)hey are practical only when the immediate local interest of each participating 
unit is not likely to be in conflict with the broader areawide interest. Since the 
agreements are voluntary, when such conflicts appear likely, governmental units 
probably would not choose to participate in an agreement, or if already partici- 
pating, would withdraw.}34 
Even if the dichotomy between area-wide and local interests set up 
in this quotation were not a serious obstacle to the mechanical provi- 
sion of basic services to the new community, it would be a serious 
obstacle to the daily governmental operation of the unitary new 
community. In fact, the dichotomy really is a trichotomy, with the 
interests of the largely self-sufficient new community deserving 
independent considerations along with the interests of the individual 
municipalities and the area as a whole. A set of intermunicipal agree- 
181 The exercise of extraterritorial power on a reciprocal basis is eliminated as a possible element because 
of the contiguity of all incorporated municipalities throughout the commonwealth. Advisory Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations, “Alternative Approaches to Governmental Reorganization in Metro- 
politan Areas,”’ at 23-23 (1962) (herein cited as ACI R: Alternative Approaches). See generally F. Sengstock, 
“Extraterritorial Powers in the Metropolitan Area’’ (1962). 
182 Intermunicipal Relations, supra note 145 at 4-6. 
133 ACIR: Alternative approaches, supra note 169, at 30-31. 
134 Thid., at 30. 
