98 
in the Commonwealth, and the total absence of any kind of annexa- 
tion enabling legislation in the general laws all suggest that Massa- 
chusetts will follow the majority rule. 
If it does, a new community could be absorbed by an existing 
municipality only by special law,™“* for no general annexation law now 
exists. As a political matter, passage of that special law would not be 
simple. In the 10 years prior to 1960 no significant annexation oc- 
curred in Massachusetts '” nor would the pattern change the new 
community scheme. Matters of local pride, the desire for political and 
social independence, and the lack of enthusiasm for assuming finaucial 
obligations of neighboring communities “* would continue, as ever, to 
be sources of potential opposition to annexation from at least one of 
the municipalities involved. Or, for example, if the annexing munici- 
pality did not object that the new town would put a strain on its 
ability to provide services, then the municipality from which territory 
is to be excised certainly would resent the loss of formerly open land 
whose appreciated value will not accrue to that annexing municipality. 
No matter which municipality is to be the annexor, potential opposi- 
tion exists within both of them, as well as within the area to be annexed 
itself. 
Although a petition for annexation could reach the general court 
under chapter 3, section 5, despite this local opposition, its road into 
enactment. would have been made no smoother. The opposition raised 
at the local level is simply shifted to another forum. The consequences 
of the shift have been described in this manner: 
(T)he legislature may be controlled by rural groups who view urban problems 
in a negative manner. Frequently there is an entrenched custom in the legislature 
described as “legislative courtesy’? whereby the legislators honor the wishes of 
the delegate or delegates of the affected areas and their opposition may thwart 
any action. It is clear those States that utilize legislative determination as the 
sole means of affecting annexation are those having the least annexation.1!9 
Perhaps a real need does exist in Massachusetts for a general annex- 
ation enabling statute.“° By providing a possible alternative to 
annexation by special act it might function at least to induce the legis- 
lature to give more serious consideration to annexation petititons, 
perhaps from a new community developer, when they do come before 
146 Tbid. 
147 Annexation, supra note 178, at 11. 
48 Tntermunicipal Relations, supra note 145, at 31. 
149 Adjusting Municipal Boundaries, supra note 149, at 7. 
150 Such a statute, of course, would be useless if the home rule status of the cities and towns in the common- 
wealth were held to render ineffective a general law setting up a procedure by which those cities and towns 
might be annexed. A Texas court has held invalid an annexation procedure that would have permitted one 
home rule city the right to annex by charter amendment, another city which had the right to adopt, but 
had not yet adopted, its own home rule charter. City of Houston y. City of Magnolia Park, 115 Tex. 101, 276 
S.W. 685 (1925). Under the Texas reading, the non-consensual annexation both of home rule cities and of 
cities eligible for home rule would be impermissible. 
In Michigan on the other hand, the courts have ignored potential home rule obstacles and have upheld 
annexation legislation simply by citing authority for the dominance of the State over municipal corpora- 
tions in matters of boundary adjustment. See, e.g., Village of Kingsford v. Cudlip 258 Mich. 144, 241. N.W. 
893 ue implication of the Michigan cases is that the legislature could provide even for nonconsensual 
consolidation. 
Massachusetts has an equally strong history of legislative dominance over municipal corporations. See 
cases cited supra note 158. But it also has a strong tradition of deference to municipalities in legislation 
affecting boundary charges. See, e.g., Stone v. City of Charlestown, 114 Mass. 214, 221-223 (1873). This fact, 
together with the home rule amendment’s application to all cities and towns, whether or not they have 
adopted a home rule charter as yet, suggests that any annexation legislation should provide only for con- 
sensual annexation of some sort. Even if the courts might approve nonconsensual procedures under a 
Michigan rationale, it is unlikely that such legislation would pass in the general court. 
Neil Littlefield concludes that even the courts could not approve of the broader legislation. 
(1)n most home rule States if some approach to area government is taken which anticipates implemen- 
tation on the State level without local approval, constitutional provisions will have to be adopted. 
Littlefield, supra note 161, at 32. 
