95 
home rule amendment. Consequently, its relative worth as a boundary 
adjustment technique may be determined by comparing its planning 
advantages and political feasibility with those of annexation and 
consolidation. 
As a planning matter, and apart from constitutional restriction, 
detachment would assure a developer greater control over the develop- 
ment of his project, and thus make the investment more attractive 
to him. For example, independence of the new community would 
allow the developer to experiment more freely with new designs and 
technology and to create a more unified plan. Moreover inde- 
pendence would allow paralled experimentation in governmental 
administration, and it would permit more representational citizen 
participation in defining the needs of the entire community.’ All 
these factors are extremely important in motivating the actual under- 
taking of a new community development. 
The negative planning factors, on the other hand, are broadly 
economic and, although vital, would not necessarily discourage a 
developer from undertaking the new community project. These 
factors include losses of economies of scale in the smaller area; diffi- 
culties in providing basic services de novo without the assistance of 
existing municipal facilities; the complexities of instituting an entirely 
new functional government bureaucracy; and the questionable 
wisdom of introducing another independent governmental unit in 
an a that is likely to require some form of metropolitan governance 
one day. 
The political feasibility of separate incorporation is not much more 
certain than that of consolidation or annexation, although the novelty 
of the idea and the variations it presents from the usual causes for 
opposition suggest a greater feasibility. For one thing, assuming some 
sort of equal overlap, neither existing municipality will stand to lose 
territory to the advantage of its contiguous neighbor; neither will be 
compelled to accept the financial obligations of its neighbor; neither 
will profit from an increased tax base at the expense of its neighbor; 
and neither will be compelled to be the sole provider of basic and 
costly municipal services. Although both municipalities will lose 
territory and potential economic growth, because the loss will be 
equal and shared it may not arouse the same antagonisms created if 
one were to lose to the advantage or the other. Furthermore, the 
creation of a wholly separate unit of government, rather than threaten 
the job security of some elected officials and municipal employees, 
most likely would increase the number of available positions and 
avoid the dilution of power in those already existing. 
CONCLUSION 
In drafting the proposed statute, all of these alternative approaches 
to deal with “home rule” problems were considered at length. After 
evaluating these various costs and benefits, the development district 
155 This advantage assumes, of course, that the real constituency of the new community consists of those 
who reside within its corporate limits. Because the new community legislation has been passed to alleviate 
statewide urban problems, the real constituency of the new community may be the people living in the 
nearby central city. Mullarkey, ‘‘The Evolution of a New Community: Problems of Government,” 6 Harv. 
J. Legis. 462, 475 (1969) (hereinafter cited as Mullarkey). Although this argument is persuasive, it does not 
deny the desirability of insuring for those already living in the new community some real role in its 
governance. 
