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of land-use planning (and seemingly the word planning itself!), were 
vociferously against the plan. 
Some interpreted the ordinance to mean that they would have to demolish their 
own homes, remove lobster traps from their yards, receive permission to cut down 
a tree on their property. Others were moved to protest that it discriminated against 
the poor, the young, the large family. Discussion was propelled by emotional 
arguments which the board was unable to direct into more reasonable channels. 
The antiplanning group gained strength, including among its sup- 
porters several local developers and contractors (who supplied bus 
transportation for local voters to the town meetings). As a result, 
the plan was defeated and the planning board was abolished at the 
next town meeting. 
Harpswell’s future was on the line, and she stood defenseless before those who 
cared not for the common heritage of coastal land * * * with no plauning board 
and no land-use laws, Harpswell waits naked for the developers’ invasion. 
What happened in Harpswell * * * could have happened in any Maine town 
that has not yet confronted the question of its destiny. 
The problems within the institutional environment are further 
complicated by the attitudes that some States have previously held 
in failing to regard the coastline as a separate resource in need of 
regulation on the State level. For example, in 1967 Maine citizens 
approved a $4 million bond issue for park and coastal acquisition, 
even though the legislation insisted on a provision prohibiting the 
use of eminent domain powers. Yet, up until now, “‘though prices in 
the meantime have doubled and quadrupled, and tens of thousands of 
desirable acres have changed from open space to luxury developments, 
the State parks and recreation department has spent only $567,000, 
less than 12 percent of the money the voters authorized. And only 
part of the purchases have been coastal property.’’ *® This, of course; 
is only part of a larger overall problem with mstitutional involvement 
in coastal allocation. In the absence of any long-range plans, local 
and State governments usually take an mcremental approach to 
satisfying increasing demands for shoreline recreation (and most other 
things, for that matter). Most governmental units react only to 
short-range problems of supply and demand, usually due to a lack of 
funds. This is understandable to the extent that States and local 
governments do not have the large amounts of money necessary to 
compete on the private market for all the coastal land that is needed, 
for the future uses, since there is no existing mechanism by which the 
values of the future users of a public beach can be measured and 
translated into tax revenues. Then, the only choice for Government 
is to try to buy small stretches of shoreland when it is needed, to 
plan only for the demands of the next 5 or 10 years. But while this 
has been going on potential sites have been privately bought and 
developed to the point where, as we have seen, practically nothing 
remains to be acquired. 
Summary 
Having recognized the high intrinsic value of our shoreline as a 
recreational resource in need of careful allocation, we have found 
the private market to be wholly inadequate within the socioeconomic 
and institutional environment. We conclude that market mechanisms 
49 Tbid., reference 14A. 
