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will result in an allocation of the coastal zone which is seriously in- 
consistent with the values of regional society. Standard market. 
imperfections such as undervaluation of public goods and side effects 
work to price the recreational values of the general public out of the 
market without having a similar effect on private, commercial, and 
industrial development. In addition, the political organization con- 
trolling the use of shoreline land through local zoning and tax policies 
also contributes to a misallocation of coastal resources, since, even if 
each community operates optimally within its own bounds, the total 
shoreline allocation will not be optimal, due to the lack of considera- 
tion of alternatives in which one community specializes in certain 
shoreline functions while another specializes in some other activity. 
Local planning may even lead to allocations that are worse than an 
unrestricted market result, since whenever a local board is faced 
with a development proposal, its first thought is toward the secondary 
or parochial benefits of the project: the effect on local payroll and 
retail earnings, broadening of the tax base, etc. Yet, these benefits 
are not net benefits, but transfer payments from some other part of 
the economy. In addition, the planning procedure of meeting in- 
creasing demands on an incremental, piecemeal basis clearly wastes 
opportunities for acquisition of valuable coastal acreage that is 
rapidly bought and developed for private, commercial, or industrial 
use. The absence of any long-range planning on the part of State 
and local governments has clearly contributed to the formation of 
the crisis we face today. 
The final question to be resolved is: given the inadequacies of the 
present system and the critical need for coastal zone allocation con- 
sistent with the values of society, what are the alternatives to the 
present allocative mechanisms? It is clear that something must be 
done right away to satisfy the demands of the immediate future; 
but there are also serious questions of long-range policy to be con- 
sidered along with current needs. The final section of this article will 
deal both with the short-term and the fundamental issues involved 
in the making of long-range policy decisions. 
V. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT 
The short run 
Clearly, there is a pressing need for the formulation of long-range 
policy with regard to our shoreline resources. Such a policy might well 
entail some radical departure from the currently accepted allocative 
mechanisms of the private market and local decisionmaking. All 
indications are that, without such changes, there is no way to provide 
adequate public recreational opportunities at our coastal shores for 
the hordes of people who will need and demand such opportunities in 
the future. But the only way to avert disaster until such a policy is 
formulated is to buy time with the traditional procedures of short-term 
planning. Such procedures have helped to get us into this mess, and it 
seems ironic that they should serve to help us correct the problems. 
But we must be wary that the problems get worse at an increasing 
rate; hence, the time that can be bought with each incremental meas- 
ure gets shorter. Any recreation planner will attest to this—as new 
beaches open, they are soon used extensively and frequently to 
capacity, depending on the location. Also, it is clear that we are almost 
