139 
especially in New England where coastal facilities are often within a 
2-hour drive from many parts of the region. The problems of ineffi- 
cient allocation, which arise because decisions are based on considera- 
tions of secondary benefits, are not restricted to the local communities. 
This could happen at the interstate level, especially when there is a 
large discrepancy in the economic posture of two nearby States. For 
example, Massachusetts is a well-developed and economically healthy 
State with a large population, while Maine is economically depressed 
and low in population. Hence, these States might take a different 
orientation toward the development of the Maine coast. The State of 
Maine might welcome oil refineries and industrial complexes as a 
stimulus to the State economy, while the residents of Massachusetts 
value the coast as a unique recreational opportunity, especially since 
Massachusetts’ shoreline facilities are already used to capacity. But 
the benefits and disbenefits to the regional society outside of Maine’s 
boundaries will not be included in the determination of the costs and 
benefits of particular development projects. Hence, the State will 
make decisions based only on the parochial effects to the State econ- 
omy. Yet this could very well constitute an inefficient use of the re- 
source and an irreversible depletion of a unique and valuable asset! 
Any new political framework for coastal resource allocation that has 
the State as the focal point for management must devote careful 
attention to problems of this sort. 
A second major consideration pertinent to the management of the 
coastal zone in the public sector is the question of that decisions are 
to be made regarding shoreline resource allocation between competing 
uses. If we conclude that the allocative mechanisms of the private 
market are to be abandoned, then the State and Federal management 
authorities must have some alternative means for determining what 
is an efficient allocation of the shoreline. This must necessarily involve 
the determination and articulation of the public interest. In the private 
market, goods have a mechanism (price-profit system) whereby the 
demands of individuals can be felt; when the aggregate of individual 
demands is high enough, private producers will attempt to satisfy those 
demands. Thus, many individual preferences can be satisfied, since 
each individual’s ‘‘vote’’ (in dollars spent) goes relatively far in 
determining the supply. Whenever enough individuals want something 
at a price, there is an incentive for someone to produce it at a profit. 
Public goods differ in that private markets fail to respond to the eatire 
range of individual demands, giving rise to a need for collective 
action. The question is, how can individual preferences for these 
goods be summed to determine if the aggregate benefit is sufficient to 
justify the total cost? This is a central question in the area of welfare 
economics, and the resolution of the issues involved must play an 
important role at the Federal and State levels in the formulation of 
management policy concerning coastal land use. 
A number of theories have been set forth involving this crucial 
determination of the public interest. The point of view of an ageregated 
social welfare function holds that society maintains a hierarchy of 
priorities based on collective values, inviting a search for the articula- 
tion of these priorities. A fundamental question to be dealt with in 
this regard is: Are these social priorities effectively articulated through 
the democratic political process as it now exists so that decision- 
57—242—_71——_10 
