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in the presence of secondary benefits, they do nothing to solve the 
problems of interstate conflicts of interest that come about for the same 
basic reasons. Indeed, the issue is the same but occurs at a different 
governmental level. Yet there is no political mechanism at the regional 
level, where these problems might best be handled, to resolve such 
conflicts. This underscores the necessity of the Federal Government’s 
taking an active role in coordinating the planning efforts of States 
and to fill the void created by the absence of regional decisionmaking 
units. This might be effectively realized through the creation of a 
national land use agency or commission, subdivided into groups that 
are to take a regional orientation toward the coordination of State land 
use Management programs. The characteristic activities of such an 
agency would include the following: 
(a) It would provide the financial and informational basis of 
support for the planning and implementation of State and 
regional land use plans, based on a review and approval of such 
lans. 
(b) It would encourage the cooperation of neighboring States 
in the development of a regionwide land use master plan, possibly 
through the formation of regional land use authorities. 
(c) It would coordinate the activities of all the Federal agencies 
in relation to land use management and develop mechanisms to 
resolve interagency and Federal-State conflicts. 
Up to this point, the formation of a new political framework has 
dealt primarily with the problem of more effective government co- 
ordination of activities with regard to coastal zone management. We 
have given considerable attention to the need for a more broadly 
based governmental body to manage coastal land resources and to 
avoid the gross inefficiencies that have come about due to the un- 
coordinated activities of local political decisionmakers. But again, we 
must remember that this is only one side of the story; we have also 
decided that the private market is unsatisfactory in the allocation of 
scarce shoreline resources. 
This presents us with the difficult circumstance of having to make 
decisions in the public sector based on trade-offs between some very 
quantifiable benefits and other inherently nonquantifiable values. The 
fact that we have abandoned the discipline of the private market does 
not mean that the circumstances that led to its failure as an allocative 
mechanism must no longer be confronted. The same kinds of decisions 
remain to be made. Indeed this is an indication that we must redouble 
our efforts concerning the identification and ‘articulation of the values 
and interests of society, since we no longer can rely on the relatively 
automatic workings of the price system, which has performed this 
function for us in the past. We cannot assume that the problems of 
inefficient coastal zone management can be solved by political reor- 
ganization alone. Poor decisions have been made in the past by local 
governmental units and by the economic system itself. Correcting the 
political problem is only half the solution, we must now face the issue 
of how to make decisions in the public sector that are consistent with 
the values of society. This is, as we have seen, no easy task. It requires 
concerted effort at both the State and Federal level. This points to 
the second major function of the Federal Government in coastal zone 
management, to be carried out within the coordinating framework 
outlined above: 
