151 
Water Conservation Fund Act in 1964. This act permits and en- 
courages user or admission fees to Federal recreation areas when cer- 
tain broad conditions are met; moreover, the imposition of admission 
fees does not preclude levying additional charges such as a camping or 
boat-launching fee. The passage of this act has stimulated to some 
extent the use of fees by a number of Federal agencies. 
One reason to expect an increase in user charges is that funds raised 
from fees at Federal recreation areas, along with certain other revenues, 
are placed in the land and water conservation fund. Subject to con- 
gressional approval, these funds are available for recreation purposes 
as grants-in-aid to States as well as for the acquisition of additional 
Federal lands for recreation. It would not seem unlikely then, that 
faced with an increasing demand for recreation the Federal agencies 
would be under considerable internal and external pressure to increase 
the importance of user fees, in order to increase the land and water 
conservation fund. 
The use of recreation fees and charges is, of course, not confined 
to Federal lands. A 1962 mail survey made by the Division of Parks 
of the State of Ohio, for example, indicated that 17 of 45 replying 
States made some charge for use of their parks, at that time. The 
proportion has no doubt increased since then. The survey also revealed 
the great diversity in the kinds of fees charged, ranging from a $10 
annual entrance fee to a 25-cent daily parking fee. Neither is the use 
of fees confined to the public level. Fees are commonly charged at 
private campgrounds or for, activities such as hunting and fishing 
on private land.* 
In summary, then, user charges for recreational lands are evolving 
from the point where essentially no charge was made to the present 
situation where they have become quite common. They are still far 
from universal and in most cases not a major source of revenue. 
IV. PRICING: ITS DETERMINATION, APPLICATION, AND EFFECTS 
Introduction 
The intended effect of any free market pricing mechanism is to 
maximize the utility or social welfare function of the individual con- 
sumer or recipient of goods and services. The free market assump- 
tion, when related to recreational goods and services, may be 
challenged on the basis of numerous market imperfections that 
nullify competitive market theory application. Political processes, as 
history points out, dominate the less persuasive forces provided by 
economic analysis in allocating resources to satisfy an elusive demand 
for recreation that may often be characterized as a nonrevealed 
preference good. 
Limiting this discussion to national (resource-oriented) and State 
(intermediate) facilities, it will be demonstrated that the arguments 
for classifying recreational’ goods as public commodities dominate 
those favoring a private categorization. The structure of pricing is 
clearly sensitive to the merit of this conclusion. The application of a 
user fee appears to contradict the philosophy grounding pure public 
commodities as exemplified in the rationale of the price theory of 
4 Clawson and Knetsch, ‘‘Economics of Outdoor Recreation,” Resources For The Future, The Johns 
Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1966. 
