Profefor Wr r11AMs on Earthquakes. 307 
ed, inferences may be drawn, and conclufions may be formed 
from them, of which, as yet, we have not the leaft thought 
or fufpicion. It has been thus in all other branches of philo- 
fophy : and the fame accuracy of obfervation and reafoning, 
when applied to the philofophy of earthquakes, will probably 
bring to light things, of which we have now no knowledge or 
conception. 
From any knowledge we yet have of the nature and caufes 
of earthquakes, nothing would appear more romantic, than to 
attempt to predic when fuch formidable concuffions will hap- 
pen. We know fo little of their caufes, much lefs when thefe 
caufes will have collected fufficient force to burit forth and thake 
the adjacent country, that we have no way to form any rational 
conclufions as to the time when an earthquake will happen, 
from any inferences founded on the knowledge of the nature 
and operations of their caufes. Nor can we receive much, if 
any, help from any preceding fign: :—I do not mean thofe 
which fear and fuperftition have formed ; but from any regulari- 
ty of their periods, —ftate of the atimofphere,——uncommon mo- 
tion of wells, fprings, and the like.—For if there is any con- 
nection between things of fuch a nature, and the happening 
cf an earthquake, it is what we do not underftand. 
But our ignorance of thefe things ought not to be made an 
argument, that there is not in reality any regularity or order in 
thefe events ; or that it will always be impoffible to difcover fo 
much of the nature and operations of natural caufes, as to dif. 
cern the fame fimplicity, order and harmony, in the feveral 
phenomena of earthquakes, as are apparent in many other works 
and operations of nature. In all thofe works of nature, of 
which we have any tolerable conceptions, ftated laws, and a 
Pp2 fteady. 
