V. 



INSTINCT AND REASON. 



One of the clieapest, easiest, and worst ways of 

 settling any delicate distinction is that of drawing 

 a hard and fast artificial line, so as to cut off the 

 doubtful or border cases by a dogmatic definition. 

 Where, for example, does instinct end, and wliere 

 exactly does reason begin ? " Oh," say many ex- 

 cellent people, with the off-hand glibness begotten 

 of thoughtlessness, "men have reason and animals 

 have instinct ! " — and, having delivered themselves 

 forthwith of this simple and effective judicial 

 summing up, they dismiss the case from court im- 

 mediately, as not deserving of further hearing. 

 Well, of course, if we choose thus dogmatically 

 to cut the Gordian knot by decreeing that in- 

 stinctive actions, when they appear in man, shall 

 be set down verbally as due to reason, while 

 efforts of reasoning, when they appear in the 

 lower animals, shall be contemptuously rc^garded 

 as beautiful examples of a developed instinct, 

 there is nothing more to be said .about the matter. 

 But such a purel}" verbal and delusive decision does 

 not really alter in any way the underlying identity 



54 



