60 INSTINCT AND REASON. 



like it. And it is just this power of learning 

 from experience, of drawing an inference from 

 one case to guide us in another, that we call 

 reason. As Mr. Romanes well says, " If I were 

 to see a large stone falling through the roof of 

 my conservatory, and, on climbing to the wall 

 above, saw three or four stones just upon the 

 edge, I should infer that the stone which fell 

 previously stood in a similar relation to my con- 

 servatory, and therefore that it would be desirable 

 to remove the others from their threatening posi- 

 tion. This would be an act of reason (though a 

 simple one) ; and it is identical with the act 

 which was performed by the crab." To deny 

 this is to give two different names to what is es- 

 sentially one and the same mental act, not because 

 of any real difference in the act itself, but be- 

 cause of differences in the dignity of the creatures 

 which happen to perform it. Such verbal juggling 

 can never lead to any clear or good intellectual 

 result. 



Another instance of undoubted reasoning in an 

 animal far higher in the scale than the crab who 

 performed this bit of syllogizing is related by Dr. 

 Bastian of an orang-outang in the menagerie of 

 the Botanic Garden at Paris. This intelligent 

 beast was accustomed, when the dinner hour had 

 come, to open the door of the room where he took 

 his meals in company with several persons. As 



