





^ULJi 



21G 



A HISTORY OF CAVALRY. 



[period II. 



began to fall fast among them, soon gave way and 

 retreated in confusion upon the second line, carrying with 

 them the depressing news of the disaster. 



At this crisis the English prince gave proof of that 

 military genius wliich made him the greatest general of 

 his age. Altliough weak in numbers, although compelled 

 to await the action upon the defensive, and to fortify 

 his position, his quick coup d'ceil saw that the instant had 

 arrived to change his plan of battle, and, abandoning the 

 defensive, to assume a vigorous and dashihg offensive 

 policy. 



That rapid decision evinced genius, but his method of 

 carrying it into execution gave proof of tactical ability 

 lar beyond the times. He detached a body of 600 

 cavalry and a large force of archers to support them, and 

 by a dctOur around a hill, out of sight of the enemy, 

 he was able to execute a well-directed attack upon the 

 left flank and rear of the second line of the French army, 

 then somewhat shaken by the fugitives from the front. 

 At the same time he mouuted all his horsemen and led a 

 furious charge direct upon the enemy as the detachment 

 them in flank. 



In that age of imperfect tactics and ignorance of 

 manoeuvres, one can readily imagine the terribly demora- 

 lising effect of a flank attack upon the undisciplined 

 levies of a mediaeval army. 



The French gendarmes, evidently in imitation of the 

 English at Crecy, received the attack, dismounted, and 

 were at once routed by the gallant charge of the English 

 knights. The French did not seem to understand that 

 at Crecy the main reliance of the English was placed 

 upon the archers, and that the men-at-arms were dis- 

 mounted to support them and give a stability to the line 

 of battle. The French dismounting on the open plain, 

 when they were unsupported by archers of any value, 

 was a waste of available power, for they had cavalry 

 Enough to have poured in fresh reserve after reserve until 

 the victory was assured. 



The French generalship was as bad as it could well be. 

 The French king was in his own country, his cavalry 



