CHAP. XVII.] 



CHARLES XII. 'S CAVALRY. 



301 



among his horsemen, in order to increase to the utmost 

 their capacity for speed and endurance. The use of 

 firearms among them was positively forbidden, and the 

 employment of hand-to-hand weapons alone permitted. 



This system of cavalry tactics was the natural outcome 

 of his daring and chivalrous spirit. He led his horsemen 

 sword in hand against infantry, cavahy, or entrench- 

 ments, over any kind of country. No difficulties daunted 

 him, for he forced his way through all opposition.' 



In the pursuit of a routed foe, his restless vigour was 

 specially manifested. He followed the retreating Saxons, 

 under Marshal Schulenberg, for nine consecutive days 

 without unsaddling, and on overtaking them at Sanitz, 

 near Punitz, he charged boldly with two regiments of 

 cavalry only, against 10,000 of them, rode over the 

 infantry who threw themselves down to evade their 

 impetuous onset, drove the Saxon cavalry from the 

 field, and then returned to attack the infantry and guns, 

 who only escaped him by night coming on, under cover 

 of which they crossed the frontier. Charles in this 

 action captured all the cannon. The fighting was 

 altogether with the sword, which was a long straight 

 weapon, and used principally for thrusting.^ 



The cavalry, under Charles XH., were taught to 

 manoeuvre with a rapidity that up to his time had been 

 unknown. It is said that in 1707 he rode two horses 

 to death, at the review of a regiment,^ proof conclusive 

 that he at least moved about with a celerity that must 

 have had a great influence upon the movements of his 

 horsemen. 



The battle of Pultowa in 1709, fought between Peter 

 the Great of Russia and Charles XII., resulted in a 

 most decisive victory for the Russians, and virtually 

 ended the military career of the King of Sweden. 



The measures taken by the Czar were very ably 

 conceived, and skilfully executed. He felt it important 

 to have his position strengthened by entrenchments, but 

 seeing that a continuous line of works confined an army 

 to a defensive system of tactics and prevented a rapid 

 ' Nolan, 18. - Ibid. » Beamish, 42, 



