CHAP, xxni.] WARS OF THE REVOLUTION. 349 



but did not organise spec-il divisions; he secured the 

 same result by detaching from the infantry divisions the 

 regiments of cavalry, and brigading them with the 

 cavalry of the reserve. 



The great numbers of the Revolutionary armies had 

 another very important influence upon the system of 

 tactics employed in action. Frederick the Great's army 

 was small, compact, and drilled to the highest perfection. 

 He could execute flank marches under the eyes of his 

 enemy with the steadiness and order of a parade move- 

 ment. He could deploy his troops, or change his front 

 under fire of artillery, as we have seen he did at the 

 battle of Sohr. He could re-form his line with perfect 

 regularity after a night surprise and defeat, as at 

 Hochkirch. He had, in fact, a h ^hly-trained imple- 

 me t, with which he could do anything. This affected 

 his tactics materially. His men fired rapidly with great 

 precision, and to avail himself of this superiority he 

 fought them in lines, and their manoeuvring capacity 

 was so great that, instead of the direct attack, he almost 

 always used the oblique order, and marched his army 

 against one or other flank of the enemy. 



The French generals of the Revolution had immense 

 numbers of enthusiastic soldiers under them, filled with 

 zeal and love of glory, but poorly drilled, both in the 

 musketry exercise and in field manoeuvres. For years 

 before the war broke out the military writers had been 

 discussing the great question of the comparative merits 

 of the column formation and that in line, as the method 

 of attack for infantr}^ Folard had written voluminously 

 in favour of the column, and he had bq^n followed by 

 Menil-Durand and others, and a large school held the 

 view, that the direct attack in heavy columns was the 

 correct system for infantry to adopt. 



Circumstances rendered this kind of formation the 

 only one open to the French. Their undisciplined 

 masses of enthusiastic recruits could not manoeuvre 

 with sufficient steadiness to compete with the regular 

 forces of Prussia and Austria. They therefore adopted 

 the system of attacking directly the positions of the 



