CHAP. XXIV.] CA vALRY UNDER NAPULEON. 383 



carry off the alcade, the chief of a convent, the master 

 of the post or hi.s deputy, and, above all, the letters. 

 Put these persons under arrest until they speak question 

 them twice each day, or keep them as hostages. Charge 

 them to send foot- messengers, and to get news. When 

 we know how to take measures of vigour and force, it is 

 easy to get intelligence. All tlie posts, all the letters 

 must be intercepted ; the single motive of procuring 

 intelligence will be sufficient to authorise a detachment 

 of 4,000 or 5,000 men, who will go into a great town, 

 will take the letters from the post, will seize the richest 

 citizens, their letters, papers, gazettes, &c. It is beyond 

 doubt that, even in the French lines, the inhabitants are 

 all informed of what passes ; of course out of that line 

 they know more ; what, then, should prevent you seizing 

 the principal men ? Let them be sent back again with- 

 out being ill-treated. It is a fact, that w^hen we are not 

 in a desert, but in a peopled country, if the general is 

 not well instructed it is because he is ignorant of his 

 trade. The services which the inhabitants render to an 

 enemy's general are never given from affection, nor even 

 to get money ; the truest method to obtain them is by 

 safeguards and protections to preserve their lives, their 

 goods, theii' towns, or their monasteries." 



Napoleon used his cavalry very skilfully to cover his 

 own movements, and the result was that his brilliant 

 strategical plans were generally successfully carried out 

 through the perfect manner in which his cavalry aided 

 him in masking his designs from the enemy. His ability 

 to discover the intentions of his opponents was not 

 more marked than his capacity to conceal his own. 



His expedition to Egypt was almost a surprise. His 

 departure from that country would have failed but for 

 the secresy with which it was effected. His campaign 

 of Marengo succeeded through the ability with which 

 he deceived all Europe as to the course he was about to 

 adopt. His march to Ulm in 1805, covered as it was 

 by the admirable horsemen led by the gallant King of 

 Naples, was hidden from the Austrian general until his 

 right was turned, his communications cut off, his army 



