CHAP. XXVIII.] AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865. 



465 



fabulous corps on his flanks, to be marched to dif- 

 ferent points. 1,700 men then capitulated to about 500. 



This afiair has been detailed at some length, as there 

 is probably no instance in history where a pursuit by 

 cavalry has ever been conduc ted with greater energy and 

 perseverance than this most celebrated of all Forrest's 

 operations. 



For three days his men had marched an average of 

 forty-one miles each day, fighting for hours several times 

 daily and nightly, and after that, in the last forty-eight 

 hours of the expedition, he had led his men, wearied and 

 jaded as they were, a distance of full ninety miles. At 

 the surrender, the Confederates formed up in line to 

 receive it were so overcome with sleep that they were 

 nearly all nodding, unable to keep their eyes open.' 



The above accounts of a few of the more important 

 actions of Morgan, Stuart, and Forrest, will give a 

 pretty clear idea of the manner of fighting which was 

 carried on in the American Civil War by the type of 

 cavalry which came into use with it. To the Southern 

 generals, Forrest and Morgan, both unprofessional men, 

 is to be attributed the credit of having originated 

 and adopted a system of cavalry tactics (we may even 

 say strategy), that was new in many of its features, and 

 a most successful adaptation of the modern improved 

 firearms to the use of horsemen. 



The principal idea, that of using missile weapons on 

 horseback, and of employing the horses simply to carry 

 men to points where they were to be employed on foot, 

 has, as we have seen, been often thought of, and repeated 

 attempts made to apply the principle practically. Alex- 

 ander had his dimachos, the Parthians used their arrows, 

 the Romans dismounted to fight on foot, the knights 

 used petronels, the men-at-arms arquebuses and pistols, 

 and dragoo s were much used subsequently, but not 

 often to advantage. In the deductions we purpose 

 placing at the end of the historical portion of this work, 

 we will consider the reasons for this failure, and whether 

 those reasons exist at the present time. 



» Campaigns of Forrest, 276, 277. 



H H 



