546 



A HISTORY OF CAVALRY. 



[PEftlOD VI. 



certainly feel the depressing and rusting effect of want 

 of exercise. 



No system could be more ill judged. One might as 

 well teach a child his alphabet, teach him every letter 

 and its pronunciation, make him go over it day after 

 day and year after year, and then on examination expect 

 him to read without ever having taught him to spell, as 

 to make officers repeat manoeuvres year .after year, and 

 expect them, by inspiration, to know how to apply them 

 practically in the ever-varying contingencies and trying 

 straits of actual war. 



The effect of this system was clearly apparent in the 

 English army in the Crimean War. Lord Cardigan and 

 Lord Lucan were officers of this type, trained in this 

 narrow school. We have already seen how the English 

 cavalry blundered off on a wrong road in a single line, 

 in blind adherence to routine, and, as advanced troops, 

 were about as useful to the army as if they had been in 

 China. 



Again, in the cavalry action at B. laklava, we have 

 seen Lord Cardigan and the light brigade sitting on their 

 horses, idle spectators of a fight in which the enemy's 

 flank was exposed to a direct attack. Kinglake, speaking 

 of this extraordinary inefficiency of the English cavalry 

 chief, makes the remarkable statement that, " supposing 

 the natural capacity equal, there is no stirring missionary, 

 no good electioneerer, no revered master of foxhounds 

 who might not be rtiore likely to prove himself equal to 

 the unforeseen emergencies of a campaign, than the 

 general officer who is a veteran in the military profession, 

 and at the same time a novice in war."' 



The Prussians long ago felt this weakness, and though 

 their discipline is strict, by their system of autumn man- 

 oeuvres they train their officers to think, and accustom 

 them to act upon their own responsibility to such an 

 extent, that it is probable no campaign was ever fought 

 in which the corps and divisional commanders acted 

 more upon their own responsibility than in that of 1870. 



It is curious and interesting to note that this weakness 



^ Kinglake, ii. 484. 



