146 



Tlie question tliercfore is simply one of construction of words. Tiie parlicuUir 

 expressions in the 1st Article of the Convention, \v hich have furnished tlie occasion 

 of a disputed construction, are "on or within tliree marine miles of any of the 

 coasts, bays, creeks, or harbours of His Britannic Majesty's dominions." For the 

 solution of this question it will be convenient, in the first place, to stale certain 

 principles of interpretataion to whicli recourse may he had wlien there is any 

 ambiguity in the terms of a Treaty. 



In the first place it is an universal rule, dictated by common sense, for the 

 interpretation of contracts, and equally applicable to all instruments, that if there 

 is anything ambiguous in the terms in whicli ihey are expressed, they shall be 

 explained by the common use of those terms in the country in which the contracts 

 were made. — Pothier, Ohligalions, No. 94, " Ce qui pent |)araitrc anibigu dans un 

 contrat, s'interpriite par ce qui est d'usagc dans le pays." 



In the second place it is an admitted principle, that for the meaning of the 

 technical language of jurisprudence, we are to look to the laws and jurisprudence of 

 the country, if the words June acquired u plain and positive meaning. (" Tlir 

 Huntress," Davie's Admiralti/ [American] Rcportu, page 100, Flint v. Fiemyng, 

 1 Barnwall and Adolphus, 48.) 



In the third place, as Treaties are contracts belonging to the Law of Nations, 

 and the Law of Nations is the common property of all nations, and, as such, a part 

 and parcel of the law of every country (Ue liovio v. Boit, 2 Gallison's Admiralty 

 [American J Reports, page 398. Buvot r. Burbot, cited by Lord Mansfield in 

 Triquet and others i. Feach, 3 Burrows, page 1481); if we have recourse to the 

 usage of nations, or to the decisions of Couits in which the Law of Nations is 

 administered, for the definition of terms which occur in such contracts, and which 

 have received a plain and positive meaning, we are not going beyond the law of 

 either of the countries which are parties to the Treaty. 



Vattel says that it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpreta- 

 tion, li the meaning be evident, and the conclusion not obscure, you have no right 

 to look beyond or beneath it, to alter or add to it by conjecture. Wolfl' adds, 

 that to do so, is to remove all certainty from human transactions. To affix a 

 particular sense, founded on etymology or other reasons, upon an expression, in 

 order to evade the obligation arising from the customary meaning, is a fraudulent 

 subterfuge aggravating the guilt of one foedifragous party — "fraus eniin udslringit non 

 dissohit perjurium.' 



These rules are adopted by T. D. Woolsey, late President of Yale College. 

 (New York, 1877), page 185, § 109, in his Introduction to the Study of 

 International Law. 



The Convention of 181i^ was a contract between Great Britain and the United 

 States, and is to be construed like any other contract. The rule for such construc- 

 tion is well laid down by Mr. Addison, in his work on contracts (seventh Kdition), at 

 page 1G4. He says: "Every contract ought to be so construed tiiat no clause, 

 sentence, or word, shall be superfiiious, void, or insignificant; every word ough<^ to 

 operate in some shape or other, nam rerhu dehent intellirji cum rfcctu ut res magis vnleat 

 (jUUM perent." 



In Rolierlsoii v. French (4 Fast 137), Lord li>lU'nbor<)Ugh says that tlu; terms 

 of a contract "are to be understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense, 

 unless they have generally, in respect to the subject matter (as by the known usage 

 of trade or the like) acquired a peculiar sense distinct from the popular sense of 

 the same ivords." 



In the case of Shore r. Wilson (9 Clark and Finnelly, pages 565, 566), Lord 

 Chief Justice Tindal, speaking of the construction of written instruments, says : 

 " When tiie words of any written instrument arc free from any ambiguity in 

 themselves, anfl where external circumstances do not create any doubt or difficulty 

 as to the jiroper application to claimants under the instrument, or to the subject 

 matttir to which the instrument relates, such instrument is ab-'ays to be construed 

 according to the strict, plain, and common meaning of the words themselves, and 

 evidence dehors the instrument, for the purpose of explaining it according to the 

 surmised or alleged intention of the parties, is utterlv inadmissible." 



In fact, Judges, Arbitrators, or Commissioners who would disregard such rules, 

 would assume the right of recasting the law or the Treaties to suit their own fancy, 

 instead of enforcing the execution of a clear contract. In this instance the two 

 parties agree not to invite this Commission to travel over such ground, and Her 

 Majesty's Govcrnnient arc confident that the Commissioners will adhere to the 



