147 



instructions contained in tlie Washington Treaty, which directs tiiein to estimate 

 the value of the privileges added by Article XVI H to those already enjoyed under 

 Article I of the Convention of 1818. 



As regards the power of Arbitrators, such as the Commissioners in this 

 instance, to interpret terms of Treaties, Hcrtslct's Treaties, vol. iii. page 518, 

 contain the following |)recedent: — 



Great Britain and the United States having referred a difficulty, growing out 

 of the Treaty of Ghent (1H14), to tlie arbitration of the Kmperor of Russia, to 

 interpret the intentions of the parties, as contained in an Article of that Treaty, 

 His Imperial Majesty staled that he considered himself I)ound " strictly to adhere 

 to the grammatical interpretation of Article I, ^c." And, on a further reference 

 to His Majesty (same vol. page .")2I), the Emperor was of opinion tliat the (picstion 

 could only be decided according to the literal and grammatical meaning of Article 1 

 of tlie Treaty of Glient. A notice of this decision is to be found in Fjavvrence's 

 second edition of \Vhe;iton, pages 4!)'), 190. 



The Knipcroroi" Russia, in dealing with this question, acted in accordance witli 

 the rules laid down in Pliillimore's Iiilornational Law, vol. ii, |)age 72, as follows : — 

 "LXIX. IJsiud iiileriircliilioH is, in the case oi' Treaties, that meaning which, the 

 practice of nations has adixed to the use of certain expressions and phrases, or to 

 the conclnsions deducible from their omissions, whether they are or are not to be 

 understood by necessary implications. A clear usage is the best of all interpreters 

 between nations, as l.'(!tween individuals; and it is not legally com|ietent to either 

 nation or party to recede from its verdict." And at page T.i the s:ime author says : 

 "The principal rtde liasaircatly i)een adverted to, namely, to follow tlie ordinary anti 

 usual acceptations, tiie [)lain and obvious meaning of tlie language employed. This 

 rule is, in fact, inculcated as a cardinal maxim of interpretation equally by civilians 

 and l)y writrrs on international law." 



The interpretiition contended for by the United States' Government requires 

 th:it we should, in eilect, insert the words '-of the shore" in the Article itself, as 

 understood, although not expressed, either before the words "of any of the coasts, 

 bays, creeks, or harbours," &ic., as necessary to make those wordb operative, or as 

 authori/.ed by usage, or before the words '"bays, creeks, or harbours," as demanded 

 by the I'onlexf. and indispensable lo prevent a conflict with other provisions of the 

 'Preaty. 



Such an intei'pretation, however, is, in the first place, not required to make the 

 words "of any of the coasts" operative. Assuming that we should be justified in 

 applying to the lingnage of the Treaty the decisions of the .\dmiralty Courts of 

 the Unitcfl States, where any words have received a judicial interpretation, the 

 Treatv being a contract according to the f^aw of Nations, and the; Admiralty Courts 

 in the United States being tribunals winch administer that law, we (ind that the 

 term ''Coast" has r<:ceived a judicial interpretation expressly with reference to 

 territorial jni isdiction ; and that, according to that interpretation, the word " coasts " 

 signihes " the par(s of the land honlerina; on the sea, and extending to low 

 water mark ; ' in other words, "the sliores at low water." 



This question was formally taken into consideration in th(» year 1804, in the 

 case of th(! " Afrieaine,' a French corvette, captured by a British i)riv.iteer olf th(> 

 b;ir of Charleston, ;ind on the oulside of the Rattlesnake Shoal, which is four miles 

 at least from land. (Bee's Admiralti) Rrportu, jjag'' 20.").) On this occasion, the 

 Commercial Agent of the Krencli Republic claimed the corvette to be restored as 

 ca[)tnre<l within the jurisdiction of the United States, and it was contended in 

 argument, in sii|)|)ort of the claim, that the term " coasts ' included also the shoals 

 to a Liiven distance; and that all geographers and surveyors of sea-coasts 

 understood, by tiie term "coasts,'" the shoals alon;; the land. Mr. .Justice Bee, 

 however, who sat in the Court of Admiraly, in Charleston, overruled this argument, 

 and after observing that the intcr|Me(ation of coasts, in the large sense of the word, 

 might possibly lie correct in .-i nuirilinif point of view, decided tiiat "coasts." in 

 reference to Icrrilorinl jurisdirlinu, is e(|uivalent to shores, and must be construed 

 to mean "the land bordering on and washed by the sea extending to low-water 

 nuirk. ' 



That the words "shores" and "coasts " are equivalent terms, according to 

 the common sense of these terms in the jurisprudence of the United States, may 

 be gathered from the language of various Acts of Congress. For instance, the 

 Revenue Act of HDi) (Laws of the United Stales, vol. iii, page 1;{G), assigns districts 

 to the collectors of revcmie, whose authority to visit vessels is extended expressly 





