w.jy 



148 



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It 



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to a distance of four Icngnos from tlic coast ; and tlie districts of these collectors in 

 the case of tlio Atlantic States are expressly recited as comprehending "all the 

 waters, siiores, bays, harbours, creeks, and inlets" within the respective States. 

 This A'.t of Coiisiicss has alwo received a judicial inter|iretation, according to which 

 the authority of revenue odicers to visit vessels is lieid to extend over tlic high seas 

 to a distance of four leagues from the sliore of the main land. Again, the Judiciary 

 Act of .lune, 1794, uses the words "coasts" and "shores" not as alternative, but 

 as equivalent terms according to judicial tiecisions on this very point, when it 

 speaks of the " territorial jurisdiction of the United States extending a marine 

 lea;>ue I'rom tiie 'coasts' or 'shores' thereof." 



It would thus ap|)ear that it is not necessary to understand the word "shore" 

 l)cfore "coasts" in order that the latter word should l)e fully intelligible. [t 

 remains to consider v.hether such an understanding would be a\ithorized by usage 

 on the |)rincip!e laid down by Pothier: " L'usage est d'une si grandc autorito pour 

 rinter|irotatiun des Conventions, (pi'on souseiilcnd dans un coiitrat les clauses qui 

 sont d'lisage, (|Uoiqn'el!es nc soient |)as cxprimees." (Ohiigatioits, No, 0->.) 



No such usage, however, of nations |)revails, applicable to the term "coasts." 

 Islands indeed, whicli are adjacent to the land, have been pronounced by Lord 

 Stowcll to be natural appendages of the coasts on wiiich they border, and to be 

 com|)rised within the bounds of territory. (" Tlic Anna," 5 Robirlsoiis lirportu, page 

 •58.").) The assertion, therefore, of an usage to understand the word "shore" before 

 "coasis" in Treaties, would tend to limit the bounds of teiritorial jurisdiction 

 allowed by Lord Stowcll in the case just cited, in which a question was involved to 

 which the United States' (iovernment was a party, and in (avour of whose claim, 

 on the ground of violated territory. Lord Slosvell |)ronounced. 



It remains next to consider wlwt is the true construction of the expressions 

 within three marine miles of any of the "bays, creeks, or harbours." That the 

 words "bays," "creeks," and "harbours," liave all and each a distinct sense, 

 separate from and snpphimental to tiie word " coasts,'! to which effect must be 

 given, where there are reciprocal rights and obligations growing out of the Treaty 

 in which these words have been introduced, is consonant with the rules for 

 interpreting contracts, which have been dictated by rigiit and reason, and are 

 sanctioned by judicial decisions. j\lr. Justice Story miiy be cited as an authority 

 of tlie highest eminence, who has recognized and a|)|)lied this principle in construing 

 a statute of the United States. "The other words," he says, " descriptive of place 

 in liie present statute (Statnie 182;"), c. 'J7G, s. 22), which declare that ' if any 

 person or persons on tiie high seas, or in any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, 

 creek, basin, or bay, within the Admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and 

 out of the jurisdiction of any |)articular State,' &c., give great additional weight 

 to the suggestion that the ' high seas' meant the open unenclosed ocean, or that 

 portion of the sea which is without the fauces terra- on th sea coast, in contradis- 

 tinction to that which is surrounded or inclosed between narrow headlands or 

 |>roniontorics; for if llic ^ /ii(/li s-cas' mraiit to incliidp other waters, whij should the 

 supplemental vorih 'arm of the sea, rirer, creek, liai/,' &('., have been uaed;'" (United 

 States r. Grnsh, 5 JNlason's Admirallii Reports, page 298.) 



This view of Mr. Justice Story is in accordance with Pothier's rule, 

 " Lorsciu'unc clause est susceptible de deux sens, on doit plutot I'cntendre dans 

 eelui dans lequel elle peut avoir quelc|ue elfet, que dans celui dans lecjuel elle ne'en 

 pourrait avoir aucun." {Oblvjalions, No. 92.) 



The word " hay " itself has also received a plnin and positive meaniiuj in a judicial 

 decision of a most important case before the Supreme Court of the United States, 

 upon tlio construction of the bth section of the Act of 17^)0, cap. D. : — A murder 

 had been committed on board the United States' ship of war " Independence," 

 lying in Massachusetts Bay, and the question was whether any Court of the State 

 of Massaciiusetts, or only the Circuit Court of the United States, as a Court of 

 Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction, had jurisdiction over a murder committed in 

 such a bay. Chief Justice Marshall in delivering the o|)inion of the Court defined 

 "bays" to be "inclosed parts of the sea." (United States v. lievan, 3 Whcaton's 

 Report.^, page 387.) 



Again, Mr. Justice Story in a question of indictment for assault, with intent to 

 kill, under the Crimes Statute of 1825, cap. 27(), sec. 22, which declares, " that if 

 any person or persons upon the high seas, or in any arm of the sea, or in any river, 

 haven, creek, basin, or bay within the Admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, 

 and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, on board any vessel, shall commit 



