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Her Majesty's Govermncnt and tlio United States, I assume, will have been pre- 

 sented before the counsel on the other side close their case. Then the counsel for 

 the United States, as delcn''ants in this case, will make their arguments, either 

 orally or on paper, just as it seems best to them, supportin^j; their own views of the 

 case, and we, as counsel for Great Britain, will present to the Court our arguments 

 n answer to the arguments which they liave adduced in support of their case. It 

 was perfectly idle for Mr. Dana to have taken up so much time in arguing that they 

 would be called on a mere hypothesis. Is it not iflle to say to your Kxcellcncy and 

 Honours, that you do not know what the case is about? Do we not all know what 

 the points in issue are; do we not all sec them? So well do the learned counsel see 

 them that they absolutely declare they <lo not intend to open the case — that it is 

 wholly luineccssary, as tlic Court now understands every single view that is likely 

 to be put forward. So they will understand, at the end of our case, every fact put 

 forward by the British Government.' 



The points are salient and plain, and are understood thoroughly by the Agents 

 and counsel of Her Majesty and of the United States. How, then, can it be said 

 there is any hypothesis at all? My learned friend (Mr. Dana) says 1 am asking 

 that an amendment to the rides should be julopted. I am not. So far from that, 

 the United States are coming in at this late stage of the proceedings, and asking for 

 an amendment of rules that were made in their present form, not merely by consent 

 of, but 1 believe at the instance of the learned Agent o?" the United States. Can it, 

 then, be said we arc asking for any amendment to be made. They are asking as a 

 favour that the Court shall lay its hands on its own rules, — rules made at the 

 instance (and in the form they now are) of the American Agent. They are asking 

 that as a favour, and at the instance of Her Majesty's Government, and with the 

 consent of the Minister of Marine, I come forward and say on behalf of the two 

 Governments that they arc quite willing so far to depart from these rules as to 

 consent to an oral argument, if the United States' counsel think it is any advantage 

 to have one, though the (Jovcrnment I represent can see no such advantage. 



I can understand that a jury may be led away from justice by specious argu- 

 ments, but I aj)prehend that this tril)unal will not be swayed by any such means, 

 and that the epitomised statement of facts given by witnesses will have more effect 

 than all the eloquence of the counsel on the other side. If the case is to be decided 

 by the eloquence displayed in the oral arguments, then I admit that Her Majesty's 

 Government would stand at great disadvantage, but I do not think that elocpience 

 will have a feather's weight in this case. I desire the Court to understand distinctly 

 that this is a motion made by the counsel of the United States to have the rules 

 altered, and I come forward, for Her Majesty's Agent and the Minister of Marine, 

 to state we arc willing it shall be done as they wish, |)rovided always they don't, in 

 getting an inch, take an ell. They will have, if they think it is an advantage, the 

 right to make a closing speech, but must immediately afterwards put in their 

 closing printed argument. They are simply to support their own case. We are, 

 then, simply called on to answer the case and argument in support of tiie speech 

 they put forward, and nothing else. Not one princi|)le of ordinary justice will be 

 infringed or departed fiom. In conclusion, I must confess 1 cannot help feeling a 

 little surprised at the manner in which Mr. Dana submitted the motion, for he put 

 it in an almost threatening manner to the tribunal, that if it was not acceded to, the 

 counsel for the United States would withdraw the proposition altogether. That is 

 not the usual mode in which a favour is asked by counsel before a tribunal. 



Mr. Foster. — I think I am entitled to a few words in reply. If the learned 

 counsel (Mr. Thomson) had been present yesterday afternoon when [ made the 

 explanation which accompanied Mr. Trescot's moticm, I think he would not have 

 made the observations which he has made. This is what 1 said : When 1 came 

 here I found myself met suddenly by live of tlie most eniinenL gentlemen who could 

 be selected from the five maritime j)rovinces, and, contrary to the exi)ectations of 

 myself and my Government, they were to be admitted to take charge of this case, 

 and they were assisted by a very eniineni lawyer, now Minister of Marine, who is 

 spoken of by counsel as having largely the conduct of this case. I alone, a stranger 

 in a strange land, having no reason to suppose counsel would be brought here to 

 assist me, found myself, I say, by the unexpected decision of the Commissioners, 

 placed in such a position that, instead of meethug the British Agent I had to meet 

 the British Agent, the Minister of Marine, and five counsel. Now, to avoid five 

 closing oral arguments against one, I was well content with the original arrange- 

 ment of the rules. But the rules provided that they might be changed if in the 



