State Bee-Keepers' Association. 8i 



"I have already shown that by no possibility can the power be derived 

 from the powers contained in Mansfield's Digest, Sec. 751, which is nothing 

 but a power to punish or abate a public nuisance, and while the named and 

 defined powers are very full, we look in vain for any power or authority to 

 abate or remove bees, as such; nor would it be constitutional if there was 

 such a statute. It is only when bees by the place or manner of keeping, or 

 the like, become a public nuisance, and to that extent and no further, does 

 the general power go . Dillon on Mun. Corp., Sec. 261. Horr & Bemiss, 

 Sec. 252, last paragraph. Emmett vs. Council Bluffs, 46 Iowa, 66. Pye vs. 

 Peterson, 45 Texas, 312. State vs. Matt, 61 Md., 292. Davis vs. Clifton, 8 

 N. C. C. P. 236. Horr & Bemiss, Sec. 144. 



'"The power cannot be given in general terms to abate that which comes 

 unciler the general definition of a nuisance, in advance of a judicial determi- 

 nation. Dillon on Mun. Cor. Sec. 308; and in Gates vs. Milwaukee, 10 

 Wallace 497. Judge Miller says : 'This would place every house, every 

 business, and all the property in the city at the uncontrolled will of the 

 temporary local authority.' So the words 'injury' and 'annoyance,' used in 

 Sec. 751, Mans, Dig. have been too often defind in like charters to need 

 further explanation here. It simply gives 5 power over nuisances, and does 

 not mean any injury or any annoyance that sensitive or iimid or nervous 

 people may imagine or fear. > 



"The bees must be per se a nui'^ance to justify this sweeping ordinance, 

 under which, according to its letter, a man cannot live in Arkadelphia, if he 

 owns bees, no difference where he keeps them; for personal property, where- 

 ever kept, is in law with the owner. In Harvey vs. De woody, 18 Arkansas, 

 252; where the mayor and other town officers were sued in trespass for tear- 

 ing down an old house which the owner had permitted to remain vacant 

 and open, and to be used as a privy, until it became unhealthful and danger- 

 ous, an ordinance was passed to abate it. To a plea setting up the ordinance 

 and facts on which it was based as a defense, on demurrer to this plea, it 

 was held a good defense. 



"The counsel of Arkadelphia try to gather comfort from this case, but 

 it would be parallel if the Des Arc Council had passed an ordinance requir- 

 ing all wooden houses to be torn down, without regard to condition or occu- 

 pancy, or compensation to the owner. We would then have a case like the 

 sweeping ordinance prohibiting bees, and requiring the removal for the pub- 

 lic good, without compensation. Would a plea setting up an ordinance re- 

 quiring all wooden buildings to be destroyed, have protected the officers in 

 the Dewoody case? 



"I shall not attempt to follow the learned counsel, or review their author- 

 ities; as far as they have any bearing on the case they sustain my position. 

 I. That the power is not given to prohibit bees by the statute. 2. That 

 bees must at the time and place, and under all circumstances be a nuisance, 

 per se, or the ordinance violates property right, and is not sustained by law . 



