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Statement of Db. Robekt A. Frosch, Assistant Secketaey of the Navt 

 (Reseaech and Development) 



Mr. Chairman, I appreciate having an opportunity to testify on behalf of the 

 Department of Defense on the three Senate bills S. 2802, S. 3460, and a lot 

 transmitted to the Congress for the Administration by the Department of the In- 

 terior, S. 3183. These three bills deal with the problems of intelligent manage- 

 ment of our coastal areas. 



The DOD supports the objectives of these bills. However, we have certain 

 observations which are respectfully submitted for you and your committee's de- 

 liberations. The first general observation has to do with the definitions contained 

 in S. 2802 and S. 3460. Some of the definitions are not consistent with generally 

 accepted international law. 



The definition of the term "coastal zone" could be interpreted as an attempt 

 by the United States to extend its sovereignty beyond its territorial sea. The 

 rights of a coastal State beyond its territorial sea are defined as a matter of inter- 

 national convention and are more limited than the scope of these bills. It is true 

 that, as a matter of domestic law, the State governments of Texas and Florida 

 have the authority, as distinct from the Federal Government, to regulate the ex- 

 ploration and exploitation of the mineral resources of the continental shelf in 

 the Gulf coast out to 3 marine leagues. These State rights, however, are nar- 

 rowly limited by both domestic law and by international convention. The pro- 

 posed definitions in these bills suggest rights of regulation and control of coastal 

 development that are much broader than presently existing State of Federal 

 rights beyond the U.S. territorial sea. 



Therefore, we believe that the use of definitions such as those of S. 2802 and 

 S. 3460 could be interpreted as a unilateral assertion of jurisdiction by the United 

 States in conflict with international law. In addition, the term "seaward bound- 

 ary" within the definition is not a recognized term of international law or un- 

 derstood legislative content and it would be confusing to introduce it into do- 

 mestic legislation. 



On the other hand, the term "territorial sea" standing alone, without defini- 

 tion, is a recognized term of international law and understood legislative con- 

 tent. Use of the phrase "territorial sea" where appropriate in the legislation 

 would provide sufficient inherent fiexibility so that the breadth thereof can mean 

 whatever is consistent with international law. 



Furthermore, the definition of the term "baseline" is unnecessary and con- 

 fusing. "Baseline" has a very clear and well-accepted meaning in international 

 law and usage. Almost universally, the term is used to refer to that line with 

 delimits the territorial sea of a nation from its internal waters. A definition of 

 the term "baseline" appears unnecessary in the legislation under consideration. 

 However, if use of the term is deemed necessary, it should be defined as : "The 

 term 'baseline' means that line which is used to divide the territorial sea of the 

 United States from its internal waters." This definition is one generally recog- 

 nized in international law. 



S. 3460 alone contains a definition of the term "estuarine sanctuary." The term 

 has no established meaning and is subject to the same objections as was "coastal 

 zone" in that it might constitute a unilateral extension of the U.S. territorial 

 sea. To avoid this result the bill's definition must be limited in area to the U.S. 

 territorial sea. Therefore we recommend that the definition be modified by adding 

 the sentence: "Such sanctuaries shall not in any event extend beyond the sea- 

 ward limit of the territorial sea of the United States." 



In connection with the foregoing points, we wish to point out that the Ad- 

 ministration's bill, S. 3183, does not present any problems of definition related 

 to international law. Accordingly, we suggest that the definitions contained 

 in S. 3183 should be used in whatever legislation is approved. 



The second general observation relates to the need to take federal government 

 responsibilities into account in the development and implementation of state 

 coastal zone management programs. We are particularly interested in assuring 

 that national security considerations are refiected in these programs. 



We believe that subsections 312(b) and (c) of S. 3460 and 309(b) and (c) 

 of S. 2802 do not adequately recognize the need to consider the mission or statu- 

 tory responsibilities of the federal agencies. These subsections could be con- 

 strued to give the Marine Council and the States power to veto projects and 

 programs .specifically authorized and directed by the Congress. 



Moreover, it is necessary that any legislation of this type include provisions 

 for consideration of essential national security requirements in the coastal zone. 



