735 



9 



however, from the standpoint of effectiveness of State programs, is 

 the fact that secretarial approval brings into force the "Federal con- 

 sistency" provision of the act, contained in section 807(a)(3). That 

 provision gives coastal State governors the right to determine, in 

 advance, whether a proposed Federal license or permit for an action 

 affecting the State's coastal zone, will be "consistent" with the State 

 coastal zone management program. In most cases — except in matters 

 of overriding national interest — 'the Federal license or permit cannot 

 be granted unless the governor certifies its consistency. This new State 

 authority may be the single greatest incentive for State participation 

 in the coastal zone management program. The Committee anticipates 

 it will have its major impact in guaranteeing effective State partici- 

 pation in decisions regarding energy facility siting. Corps of Engi- 

 neers dredge-and-fill permits. Federal activity in the Great Lakes, 

 and — as described in detail below — offshore oil leases. 



In the spirit of equitable balance between State and national in- 

 terests, the act also contains a "national interest" provision. That part 

 of the law requires States, in developing coastal zone management pro- 

 grams, to give "adequate consideration to the national interest in- 

 volved in the siting of facilities necessaiy to meet requirements which 

 are other than local in nature." 



As often happens with new laws and programs, the Coastal Zone 

 Management Act and the related State programs remained unappre- 

 ciated by the public at large imtil a crisis brought it forcefully to peo- 

 ple's attention. The oatalvtic crisis in this case was the energy problem, 

 with its pressures for development of new sources of supply. The 

 coastal zone has always been a favored spot for the location of power- 

 plants (both nuclear and fossil fueled), oil refineries, and staging areas 

 for offshore oil development. But it was not until the Arab oil embargo 

 occurred, exactly a year after passage of the Coastal Zone Management 

 Act, that State governments realized the intensity of these develop- 

 mental pressures on the coastal zone. There had been earlier indica- 

 tions of future energy-related developments,*' but the energy crisis 

 seemed suddenlv to shorten the time available to States to plan for and 

 cope with developmental pressures. Governors and other State-level 

 leaders expressed the frustration they felt at the prospect that irrev- 

 ocable Federal decisions affecting their coastal zones would be made 

 before the States had had time to develop management programs. 



It was in the context of prospective OCS oil and gas development 

 that President Ford endorsed the Coastal Zone Management program 

 during a November 1974 Wliite House meeting with governors of 

 coastal States. On that occasion the President also proposed — and 

 Congress subsequently granted — a $3 million supplemental appropria- 

 tion for fiscal year 1975, added to the program's $12 million regular 

 appropriation, to enable States affected by planned OCS leasing to 

 speed their preparation for possible shoreside impacts of these 

 activities. 



" For pxamplp. thp l;>69 Stratton Commission report notPd that tho offshore oil and sras 

 Industry -was "frrowinp rapidly" and was likely to expand its operations to the Outer 

 Continental Shelves off the Atlantic and Alaskan coasts. Further, the report noted that 

 electric power y)roflnction in the United Stntes was doiiblini.' every decade, and with the 

 advent of nuclear power, many sites near water would be needed. "An increasing number 

 of plants will be located along the shoreline, competing for valnable land, warming the 

 local waters, and posing major threats to the regional ecological balance," the report 

 stated. 



