40 DEVELOPMENT OF SHIPYARDS IN THE 



proper fire protection systems where none existed, and to bring others to a satisfac- 

 tory standard. Layouts of fire protection piping were furnished to the shipyards and 

 fire engines and other equipment purchased and properly distributed. The financial 

 question immediately confronted the Fleet Corporation. Many of the yards claimed 

 that they did not need fire protection to the extent demanded by the corporation. 

 Others claimed that they were without funds to establish the systems. In one case, 

 a yard maintained that it was not in need of fire protection, having existed for half 

 a century without such protection. That particular yard was burned to the ground 

 a few months after its assertion had been made, and this experience had a decided 

 efifect on other yards. It became firmly established that the only way in which fire- 

 protection systems could be installed under the existing conditions was by pressure 

 and financial aid from the Fleet Corporation. 



If we bear in mind that the country wanted ships, it will be clear that the 

 Emergency Fleet Corporation was justified in financing fire-protection systems. It 

 was felt that not even the loss of a single vessel should be incurred if it could be 

 prevented by the expenditure of the comparatively small amounts invested in fire 

 protection. It is true that the vessels were covered by insurance, but money paid as 

 insurance in case of fire could not carry goods to Europe. It was pointed out par- 

 ticularly that the Navy was spending $500,000,000 for the construction of destroyers 

 whose function was to prevent the loss of merchantmen through submarines. Fire 

 protection systems performed a similar function, and the $2,000,000 requested for 

 the installation of fire protection did not seem excessive. 



For the twelve months ending February 28, 1919, there were 519 fires in ship- 

 yards ; 372 of these fires caused no loss, while 1 57 caused a total damage of $320,000. 

 During this period 1,805 keels were laid, 1,040 hulls launched, and 625 ships de- 

 livered. Only four hulls were damaged by fire, causing a total loss of not more than 

 $50,000. Only two fires caused a loss exceeding $100,000. No fire protection had 

 been installed in either of these yards, and our reports show that had water mains 

 and other fire equipment been in service, neither of these yards would have been 

 badly damaged. 



With the designs of the shipyards prepared under war conditions by many dif- 

 ferent interests, some of whom had had but little experience in shipyard work, it 

 can readily be understood that the results were not always the same. A comparative 

 study has been made of the facilities which were provided : First, that of all yards 

 under the cognizance of the Emergency Fleet Corporation ; second, that of the yards 

 showing the best production. The results of these examinations of the Emergency 

 Fleet Corporation records are given in the following discussions : — 



The measure of the efficiency of the yards included in this study is taken as their 

 yearly output in ships. For this output study the steel shipyards were divided into 

 certain classifications according to their ability to build ships within limits of length 

 and breadth, and for the purposes of the study were grouped into two divisions. 

 The first division consists of Classes B and C, and includes ships from a minimum 

 length of 175 feet and a minimum breadth of 36 feet to a maximum length of 345 



