GERMAN SUBMARINES IN PARTICULAR. 113 



coast of Ireland and some off the Azores. From that moment on the loss to ship- 

 ping in these localities very appreciably decreased. 



It is a rather well-accepted American adage that "It pays to advertise." The 

 secrecy which has enshrouded submarine design, construction and operation has 

 been one of the most serious drawbacks in regard to the development of subma- 

 rines not only in this country but throughout the world. While this feature may be 

 necessary in war time, there is a good deal of doubt thrown upon the methods fol- 

 lowed by the Allies in connection with this matter. Many authorities doubt the 

 advisability of keeping losses of submarine vessels secret, especially when their 

 destruction was accomplished by ordinary methods of war. The idea was to under- 

 mine the morale of the enemy, and opinions vary as to whether this was successfully 

 accomplished. There is no doubt that the morale of the enemy was undermined, 

 but, from the present information available, it appears that the morale of the sub- 

 marine navy of the enemy was superior. to that of the remainder of the naval 

 service. 



The value of submarines, in both offensive and defensive operations, has never 

 been fully appreciated except by a very small number of technical people. This 

 statement requires no proof, but if proof is desired, all that is necessary is to read 

 the first three chapters of Admiral Jellico's book, "The Grand Fleet." There is 

 sufficient evidence contained in the first part of this book to convince any quantity 

 of doubting Thomases relative to the value of submarines from a military point of 

 view. If it were not such a serious matter, it would almost approach the ludicrous 

 if one determined the amount of energy that was expended by the Grand Fleet in the 

 early stages of the war, owing to the presence, suspected or actual, of one or more 

 submarines in Scapa Flow or the vicinity thereof. The defenseless condition of 

 these bases has been thoroughly brought out in this book, and the herculean efforts 

 made to make these bases submarine-proof form an interesting chapter of the early 

 stages of the war. 



"Great stress has been laid upon the value of patrol services as a defense for 

 capital ships against submarines, but no patrol service, however efficient, can guar- 

 antee absolute safety to the heavy ships when they are at sea within the radius of 

 hostile submarines, and it would be futile to deny that the menace of underwater 

 attack has considerably modified fleet strategy. Under present conditions the capi- 

 tal ship, as soon as it leaves harbor, is exposed to a form of attack which, if suc- 

 cessful, may cause its complete destruction, and will in any case almost certainly dis- 

 able it. The vessel may be surrounded by destroyers, but even so it is not wholly 

 safe, for several instances have occurred where the submarine evaded the defending 

 screen and planted her torpedoes in the vitals of the large ship. The capital ship 

 itself is all but helpless against an attack from below. She may be heavily armored 

 and carry a powerful battery of main and secondary guns, but at best she will have 

 only a swiftly moving periscope to fire at, while her invisible antagonist has for tar- 

 get a large area of unarmored side and bottom." 



