160 BUOYANCY AND STABILITY OF TROOP TRANSPORTS. 



It was recognized that it was not practicable, without inadmissible delay, toi bring up 

 the transports to the plane of safety against torpedo attack of a battleship, and that the 

 main responsibility for safety oi our transports rested upon otir destroyers and other con- 

 voying vessels. These gave a very thorough illustration of Farragut's maxim, that the best 

 defense is a vigorous offense, and no eastbound troop-laden transport convoyed by our Navy 

 was touched by a torpedo. The President Lincoln, westbound, was hit by three torpedoes, 

 rendering her sinking inevitable, but she did not capsize. Neither did the Covington, which 

 remained afloat a night and the better part of a day after being torpedoed. The Mount Ver- 

 non was hit at about the worst possible place, at the worst possible time — so- far as loss of 

 life was concerned — just as the watches were being changed. She returned safely to port, 

 as did the Finland. 



The President : — The Chair notes the presence of a distinguished naval officer whose 

 duty it was to fit out many of these ships during the war. Perhaps he has something to 

 contribute to the discussion. He appears not to recognize the allusion, although I am look- 

 ing straight at him. 



Captain George H. Rock^ C. C, U. S. N., Member: — I have not read Professor Hov- 

 gaard's paper. I did not get an advance copy, and I did not arrive in time this morning to 

 hear it read — except a very small part of it at the last. I was at the Navy Yard on duty 

 when the transports were fitted out and commissioned, and I was there when Captain Hov- 

 gaard was at the yard on several occasions making his investigations for the Bureau of Con- 

 struction and Repair. 



I was reminded, in listening to the latter part of his paper, of the feeling we had at 

 the yard in getting the transports ready. It was essential, as you know, to have them sail 

 and get the troops across, and we had to determine as to the number of troops we would 

 send without waiting for the stability calculations. We did not have any plans of the 

 vessels. We prepared some lines, but some of the vessels we could not dock, and therefore 

 could not take the offsets, and were not able to draw the lines and incline them and work up 

 their stability calculations. We had to fix on the amounts of ballast to make them safe for 

 the live loads they were to carry, and in that work the secretary of your society, Mr. D. H. 

 Cox, was quite prominent, and really had the greater part of the work to do. 



I will just instance the way the Leviathan was handled. We settled at the yard on car- 

 rying 7,500 troops on the first trip in addition to the 500 or so officers for the army, and the 

 1,500 navy personnel, and requested the commanding officer to report at the end of the 

 first trip, as to whether, in his judgment, based on her behavior at sea, the number of 

 troops could be safely increased. The rolling tanks with which the Leviathan was fitted 

 were not used, and we had to determine the amount of necessary fixed ballast without their 

 use. 



After the first trip, the report of the times of rolling and the behavior of the ship at 

 sea led the Bureau of Construction and Repair to authorize an increase in the number of the 

 troops to be carried to 10,000, and later, when we had a chance between trips, after she 

 had made three or four round trips, we made further changes in the vessel, and the num- 

 ber was increased to 12,500 troops. At the same time the navy personnel was increased 

 about 1,000 and the number of army officers was proportionately increased. On the other 

 ships, where the numbers could not be determined in any other way, we handled the sub- 



