324 BANQUET. 



Before closing this rapid sketch, I will mention several things about the submarine prob- 

 lem. When the war came, Germany had only 28 submarines and during the course of the 

 war she built 340 others. The Germans lost 200 submarines during the war, and at the end 

 of the war they had only 168 left, so that the submarine menace was a real one. There is 

 a distinction made always on the other side between what was called the "danger zone" and 

 simply the area in which submarines were operated. The "danger zone" meant where the 

 submarines were actually operating, and you had to have double or treble escorts to get 

 through that danger zone, whereas when you passed outside that zone the escort was reduced 

 to fewer ships. 



There is one thing also I want to emphasize. I have just told you the number of ships 

 engaged in the Atlantic troop transport service, and I said that 85 per cent of the shipping 

 was cargo ships. None of those statistics include the ships in the Mediterranean, because 

 there was only one convoy which came from the United States to Gibraltar during the whole 

 war. The supply ships which came to the Mediterranean, as far as North America and 

 South America were concerned, came across singly and unescorted to Gibraltar, and were 

 there joined up with the convoys going on into the Mediterranean. 



In the brief history of the convoy system, there is a statement which I think is well 

 worth quoting, showing the difference between the troop and cargo convoys. It is 

 as follows: — 



"In general, transports were assigned a destroyer escort, which was about three times 

 as strong as the escort assigned to cargo vessels. In some cases of particularly valuable 

 transports the escort was ten times as strong as the escorts assigned to cargo vessels. 



"During the darkness the periscope of the submarine is useless, and submarines must 

 come to the surface if they desire to deliver attack. While on the surface submarines be- 

 come subject to attack by destroyers surrounding the convoy. During the ordinary dark 

 night visibility does not exceed half a mile to a mile, and as the convoy is completely dark- 

 ened the probability of a submarine finding a convoy at night is extremely remote, and there 

 is considerable risk to the submarine if it decides to attack. For the foregoing reasons 

 troop convoys in general, while in. the open sea, were brought through the most dangerous 

 submarine areas during darkness. 



"As only about 15 per cent of the vessels in Atlantic convoys carried troops, it became 

 desirable, so far as practicable, to route troop transports in special lanes through which 

 cargo convoys did not pass. This greatly increased the safety of troop transports, as it 

 practically forced submarines to concentrate their efforts in the areas through which cargo 

 vessels (comprising 85 per cent of the shipping) passed. 



"If a German submarine took station in a troop transport lane he might have remained 

 for weeks without sighting a troop convoy. This failure to find shipping in. troops lanes 

 forced the submarine into the cargo lanes and so gave a large measure of protection to 

 troop convoys. If the submarines had known the position of these troop lanes and had 



