THE MAINTENANCE OF THE FLEET. Ill 



will require at least two months to overhaul and adapt her to government require- 

 ments. During the "War with Spain" we purchased colliers having a gross ton- 

 nage of 42,500 tons at a cost of $76 per gross ton. Economy and serviceability 

 point to the entire desirability of building ships for the special service required. 

 We have worked out and know every detail of what we want as colliers, oilers, 

 refrigerator, repair, transport, water tank, ammunition, and hospital ships, tor- 

 pedo-boat destroyers and submarine tenders, mine layers, mine sweepers, merchant 

 scouts, aeroplane transports, tugs, coal lighters, and buoy tenders. 



In supplies are included reserve ammunition, medical stores, fresh and dry pro- 

 visions, clothing, equipment, fresh water, "canteen" stores, both afloat in supply 

 ships and at the naval bases. Fuel means the ability to deliver the blow without 

 delay. Delay means the loss of the initiative. Operations can only be based on 

 available means, and, in modern war, you cannot plan and then assemble stores to 

 execute the plan. After war is declared it becomes a question of supplies and 

 weapons at the front, or else falling back on the defensive and trying to gather 

 from every source the supplies needed even for the defensive. With fortified 

 island bases each would become a stepping stone to the next, and a center from 

 which to sally forth, attack and harass, and to which to return for supplies, rest 

 and overhaul. Our real coast line would become, as it were, more remote from our 

 enemy as these obstacles in his path hindered his free movements, and, on the 

 other hand, these island bases would have the effect of extending our coast line 

 out into the ocean for our own forces. As sources of supply they are as valuable 

 to the enemy as to us, unless we fortify them adequately and defend them with 

 submarines, torpedo boats and mine devices. 



All this sounds like the stock language of the rampant militarist looking for 

 and bringing on trouble, but is simply the cold business of insurance against and 

 avoidance of trouble through prevision and provision. There is, moreover, no rea- 

 son in forbidding business in foreign relations, or diplomacy in making for mar- 

 kets and trade opportunities. Tutuila, Midway and the Aleutian Islands come into 

 the question of island bases as auxiliary centers of supply and security, or as centers 

 of scouting and offensive, not to mention commercial operations. Over and above 

 all lies Guam in its position of unique, commanding and supreme importance, the 

 "Key of the Pacific." On what we do there depends our future on that ocean, and 

 as a peaceful, law-abiding and properly respected member of the community of 

 nations. If we rise to the occasion, no one can take the Philippines if we should 

 let go, or drive us out until we choose to go in our own time and in our own way. 

 Geography is knocking loudly at our door. 



No one can trouble the fishing industries and rich coal fields in our store- 

 house of the future in Alaska if there is a fortified base in the Aleutian Archi- 

 pelago. Tutuila, 5,700 miles from Panama, 2,276 from Honolulu, 3,159 from Guam, 

 and 4,500 from Manila, is only 1,565 miles from Auckland and 2,377 from Syd- 

 ney, with their supplies of fresh provisions and coal. The Panama Canal has 

 made its beautiful landlocked harbor a priceless heritage in our manifest destiny 



