moving to new species or areas. Stated in different 

 terms, landings have declined relative to what 

 might have been expected if catches of most 

 species had been stabilized, by proper manage- 

 ment, at levels ranging from about 50 to 60 per 

 cent of peak landings. 



Wliat has gone wrong? The years of work by 

 the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries have not been 

 sufficient to get the physical catch rate of the 

 United States flag fleet in step with world develop- 

 ment of ocean fisheries, nor to prevent a con- 

 tinuing and, in some areas, accelerating decline in 

 the economic vitality of the American fishing 

 industry. Even the rapid increases in funding and 

 in the range of Bureau activities in the past decade 

 do not seem to have produced any major change in 

 these long term trends. 



The causes of this disturbing record of perform- 

 ance cannot be pinned down to a few dramatic 

 failures of commission or omission. Simple 

 answers are rarely found for issues as complex as 

 those besetting the U.S. fisheries. The Federal 

 Government has never done justice to its functions 

 in promoting rational use of the Uving resources of 

 the sea because it fishery agency has never been 

 given broad enough direction by the Congress to 

 permit it to carry out a unified program to suit the 

 needs of the country as a whole. The BCF program 

 has evolved by a process of tacking on projects one 

 by one, most of which have generally been thrust 

 upon it to meet particular crises, often as the 

 result of pressure by special groups. Appropria- 

 tions are based principally on the support of these 

 projects. Thus BCF is helpless to execute a 

 dynamic program based on national needs; instead, 

 it can only carry on with its agglomerate activities 

 inherited from the past, and wait for further crises 

 which its timely services would otherwise have 

 averted. 



The following diagnosis of Bureau operations, 

 concepts, and organization is based on extensive 

 interviews with a wide variety of people directly 

 and indirectly concerned with its operation. The 

 most important inputs have been provided by the 

 Bureau itself. The panel does not hold it out as a 

 definitive statement, but it does feel that it is a 

 reasonably accurate explanation of the apparent 

 failure to come to grips with basic problems 

 afflicting the U.S. fishing industry, and that it 

 points the way to a more positive and productive 

 program. The panel states emphatically that the 



Bureau itself has been keenly aware of its own 

 internal problems, and in recent years has formu- 

 lated a series of recommendations for basic restate- 

 ment of objectives and functions very much closer 

 to those contemplated in this report. Many of the 

 most critical changes are, however, still in the 

 discussion phase, at either Bureau or Department 

 level. The following analysis of the Federal fishery 

 program is still appropriate as an explanation of 

 the situation that prevails at present. 



It is clear that the current program and organi- 

 zation of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries do 

 not reflect an integrated plan, geared to an 

 unequivocal set of objectives. Like the agency, the 

 budget has grown piecemeal over time, and much 

 of the grov/th represents Bureau, industry, and 

 congressional response to urgent problems of the 

 moment. Many of these pressures generated pro- 

 jects and programs that long outlived the initial 

 reason for their inception. 



Because of this pattern of growth, together 

 with the highly emotional and localized nature of 

 the interest in fishery matters, the Bureau of 

 Commercial Fisheries budget is marked by a high 

 degree of inflexibiHty. Some of its programs are 

 statutory in nature and cannot be altered by the 

 Bureau itself. Others stem from projects of partic- 

 ular interest to individual legislators or strong 

 industry groups, and can be eliminated or altered 

 only with great difficulty. Still others are geared to 

 unique abUities or special interests of scientific and 

 technical personnel within the agency— in effect, 

 good men get support for their areas of interest as 

 long as they fall generally within the purview of 

 the Bureau's responsibiUties. It is unlikely that as 

 much as 20 per cent of the BCF budget could be 

 considered open to revision to meet new chal- 

 lenges and opportunities. 



The resulting tendency of the BCF program to 

 develop, by fits and starts, without reference to a 

 considered set of priorities is accentuated by the 

 absence of any clear cut statement of objectives. 

 The congressional mandate to the Fish and Wild- 

 life Service has never been completely clear, and 

 even the legislation in 1956 that prescribes the 

 official BCF mission is not specific enough to 

 provide much guidance. The inevitable result has 

 been a relatively comfortable and static approach 

 to fishery problems, under which good people did 

 good work on various projects in various areas 

 without being overly concerned about the way in 



VH-45 



