the key to any major expansion of U.S. flag fishing 

 effort, available information is so inadequate as to 

 restrict severely any sensible investment planning 

 by the private sector. Similarly, efforts to improve 

 existing gear, to develop new versions of conven- 

 tional equipment, and to take the lead in research 

 aimed at entirely new detection and harvesting 

 techniques are budgeted at low levels. 



These deficiencies and gaps in Government 

 programming are particularly striking, since the 

 panel finds clear evidence of highly successful 

 work of both types by the BCF and by some State 

 agencies. Successful, though limited, exploratory 

 work has created several new industries now 

 supporting profitable fishing ventures; and, even 

 on a budget that permits only a few programs per 

 year to function, breakthroughs have occured in. 

 developing new versions of conventional fishing 

 gear that have been of great advantage to individ- 

 ual groups of U.S. fishermen. 



The conclusion seems warranted that failure of 

 the Federal effort to produce any increase in U.S. 

 flag landings in the past three decades is attribut- 

 able to the very restricted level of effort and to 

 some imbalance in its program rather than to any 

 absence of need for positive facilitating action by 

 government. In a larger sense, the alarming posi- 

 tion of the U.S. fisheries reflects a host of 

 institutional, economic and social barriers to effi- 

 cient development and management, and the 

 absence, at State, National, and international 

 levels, of organizations capable of assuring rational 

 use of Uving resources of the sea. 



A. Objectives 



What does "rehabilitation of the American 

 fishing industry" mean? What should be the 

 objectives of an altered and expanded program 

 aimed at "rehabiUtation?" Perhaps the most logi- 

 cal procedure is to start with an indication of 

 objectives which the panel regards as inappro- 

 priate. 



First, the fact that the United States has slipped 

 from second to sixth place among the world's 

 fishing powers means nothing in and of itself. 

 There is no logical reason why the United States 

 should aim at producing more fish than any other 

 country (or at second, third, or fourth place) 

 merely for the sake of being first, second, third or 

 fourth. Most major fishery products are now 



international objects of commerce. Some can be 

 produced more efficiently by other nations than 

 by the United States, and it is in the interest of 

 both the processing-marketing sector of the fishing 

 industry and the U.S. consumer that artificial 

 barriers to buying wherever price and quality are 

 best be reduced to a minimum. Efforts to expand 

 the physical volume of U.S. landings simply for 

 prestige purposes are almost certain to divert 

 effort and funds from the far more productive 

 alternative of concentrating effort on those areas 

 where expansion is possible on a profitable basis 

 because American producers have potential com- 

 petitive advantages. 



The panel also stresses the fact that "expanding 

 employment in the fisheries" is not a legitimate 

 objective of any program of rehabilitation. Most 

 efforts to increase employment in the American 

 fishing industry, have had the effect, intended or 

 unintended, of repressing incentive and oppor- 

 tunity for modernization of fishing vessels and 

 methods. In the long run they have contributed as 

 much as any single source to the alarming decline 

 in the competitive position of the U.S. industry. 

 One authority recently noted that the impact of 

 anticipated increases in wages (pressure for which 

 arises from U.S. industries in which labor is used 

 with greater productivity) could raise the costs of 

 U.S. fishing enterprises by as much as 80 per cent 

 over the next 1 5 years unless the industry shifts to 

 more efficient techniques (Norton, 1968). 



Finally, the panel stresses the need to analyze 

 efficiency requirements for U.S. fishing enterprises 

 in the Ught of U.S. conditions. The fact that other 

 nations employ very large vessels, capable of 

 fishing anywhere in the world, fleets employing 

 mother ships and factory vessels that produce 

 finished products of many kinds at sea does not 

 mean that the United States should follow suit. 

 Many of these nations employ such techniques 

 simply because they must carry on fishing activi- 

 ties at long distances from home ports. There is 

 much truth in the generalization that nothing can 

 be done at sea as cheaply as it can ashore. 

 Therefore, it is not only possible but likely that a 

 thoroughly modern, competitive U.S. flag fishing 

 fleet would include relatively few large distant 

 water vessels capable of staying at sea over 

 extended periods, and even fewer factory type 

 vessels. What is needed are fleets geared technically 

 to the physical tasks and economically to U.S. 



VlI-52 



