that it sell for a price which just maintains the 

 profitability of that amount of effort. 



At the level of money costs and receipts 

 assumed above, it is obvious that uncontrolled 

 exploitation would lead to a smaller sustained 

 physical and money yield than would be possible 

 with less fishing effort and lower total costs. This 

 apparent violation of business practice and com- 

 mon sense results from the fact that the resource is 

 common property, owned by no one, and there- 

 fore regarded as a free good by all. 



A rational private owner would use only those 

 fishing units required to maximize the economic 

 return on the valuable property right— rent, in a 

 technical sense. But with unrestricted access to the 

 fishery, any attempt to "conserve" by one fisher- ^ 

 man or group simply increases the take of others. 

 The net return potentially available from the 

 fishery is wasted in excessive costs, through over- 

 capacity in fishing gear and men, and through 

 increased costs per unit as the population is 

 depleted. 



Moreover, this unhappy situation is couched 

 only in terms of long run equilibrium, in which 

 money returns are just sufficient to prevent 

 further entry or exit at a rate of output consistent 

 with stabiUty in the size and composition of the 

 fish stock. The development of a new fishery, 

 however, is likely to be marked by a surge of new 

 fishermen that carries capacity well beyond the 

 levels appropriate for long run equilibrium. It is 

 not only possible but normal for excess capacity 

 to develop quickly and to persist over long periods 

 of time, accentuated by the traditional immobility 

 of labor in the fisheries and the related ability to 

 maintain capital equipment at little or no real cost. 

 It is no accident that the most valuable fish are 

 often harvested by fishermen with the lowest 

 incomes. 



A fishery need not be depleted in this sense, of 

 course, if cost-price relationships are less favorable 

 than in the example given. In the extreme case, 

 where no level of effort will produce enough 

 income to cover costs, there is neither a fishery 

 nor, in an economic sense, a resource. It is 

 apparent that the level of effort, and the extent of 

 overfishing, however defined, depend just as much 

 on the economic factors affecting costs and prices 

 as on the biological factors affecting physical 

 yield. 



A number of corollaries foUow from this 

 analysis. If, starting from an equilibrium point at 

 or beyond maximum physical yield, market de- 

 mand for the end product increases, the final 

 result will be a higher price, higher real costs, and 

 lower catch. Similarly, technological improve- 

 ments in fishing, processing, or marketing which 

 lower costs of production, will eventually reduce 

 output and raise prices to consumers as the effects 

 of more severe over-fishing become evident. 



Two additional points deserve emphasis. These 

 undesirable results stem not from ignorance but 

 from rational efforts by businessmen to maximize 

 profits. And they are not the result of monopoly; 

 the more competitive the industry, in the absence 

 of control over fishing effort, the more certain the 

 resulting depletion and economic waste. The case 

 for regulation of heavily exploited fisheries is very 

 strong— and it is essentially an economic case. It 

 should also be stressed that this concept of 

 regulation requires specific types of biological and 

 economic data. A fishery-by-fishery evaluation of 

 the need for regulation should also include meas- 

 ures to provide these data. 



Given the necessity of controlling the fishery 

 for many valuable species, what should be the 

 specific objectives? A review of the literature in 

 the field of fisheries management leads to the 

 conclusion that neither biologists nor economists 

 have come to full agreement, separately, or among 

 themselves, on this most vital starting point. 



It would be unfair to say that the economic 

 aspects of fishery management have been ignored, 

 or that human welfare has not been regarded as a 

 primary objective. Nevertheless, the fact remains 

 that in salmon, haUbut, tuna, and virtually all 

 other practical regulatory programs the simple and 

 apparently unambiguous objective of maximum 

 sustained physical yield has been dominant. A 

 regulatory scheme geared to this objective alone 

 would provide better results than unrestricted 

 fishing; but maximum physical yield, as a sole 

 objective of fishery conservation, is not unambig- 

 uous, not simple, and not adequate. 



It is simply impossible to make sense of fishing 

 regulation except in economic terms. Why con- 

 serve fish at all? Unless the end products of the 

 fishery are worth more in money than the cost of 

 producing them there would be neither a fishery 

 nor a conservation problem. Physical yield be- 

 comes important only if the value of the fish is 



VII-64 



