required all boats licensed to trawl for shrimp in the State's waters to dock at a South Carolina port, 

 unload, pack, and stamp their catch before shipping or transporting it to another State. The Court 

 declared this statute unconstitutional. Concurring with the Court's decision, Mr. Justice Frankfurter 

 said, 334 U.S. at 409: 



. . . When a State regulates the sending of products across State lines we have commerce among the 

 States as to which State intervention is subordinate to the Commerce Clause. That is the nub of the 

 decision in Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1. South Carolina has attempted such 

 regulation of commerce in shrimp among the States. In doing so she has exceeded the restriction of the 

 Commerce Qause. 



The line to be drawn between the legitimate exercise of the State's police power to regulate the 

 taking and use of animals ferae naturae, and the paramount powers of the United States under the 

 commerce clause is not clear. However, the Supreme Court has enunciated certain general principles 

 regarding the States' poUce power.' ^ In each case involving the commerce clause, the courts must 

 balance the adverse effect on interstate commerce imposed by a State law against the local benefits 

 which the law was designed to achieve. In holding that a Maryland law prohibiting the use of purse nets 

 in the tidal waters of the State had a rational basis and that the interference with interstate commerce 

 was "merely incidental," the District Court in Corsa v. Tawes^^ said: 



. . . in the absence of conflicting Congressional legislation under the commerce clause regulation of the 

 coastal fishery is within the police power of the individual states . . . Congress has not sought to impose 

 uniformity, but has been content to leave the matter to local authority and has recently made this 

 intention explicit . . [citing the Submerged Lands Act of 1 953] . 



Doubtless catching menhaden and processing them into useful products is a legitimate occupation and in 

 commerce the interstate aspects of which cannot be interfered with arbitrarily. But the same 

 Constitution which puts interstate commerce under the protection of Congress recognizes the 

 sovereignty of the states in local regulation for the protection of their natural resources. If the adverse 

 effect on interstate commerce is only incidental and indirect and is outweighed by the local benefits 

 which the statute is designed to achieve, the commerce clause will not render the enactment invalid. . . 



E. Submerged Lands Act 



To fill out a consideration of the Federal-State powers to regulate fisheries, attention must be given 

 to the Submerged Lands Act of 1953,' ^ which provides in part: 



It is determined and declared to be in the public interest that (1) title to and ownership of the lands 

 beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective States, and the natural resources within 

 such lands and waters, and (2) the right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop and use the said 

 lands and natural resources all in accordance with applicable State law be, and they are, subject to the 

 provisions hereof, recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and assigned to the respective States 



18 



The Act defines "natural resources" to include minerals and "fish, shrimp, oysters, clams, crabs, lobsters, 

 sponges, kelp, and other marine animal and plant life ..."'' Finally, the Act provides: 



* * See, for instance, Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). 

 '*149 F. Supp. 771, 773, 776 (D. Md., 1951), affirmed, 355 U.S. 37 (1957). 

 '■'Act of May 22, 1953, 67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. 1301-1315. 

 '*67 Stat. 31, 43 U.S.C. 1311(a). 

 '^67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. 1301(e). 



VII-74 



