The United States retains all its navigational servitude and rights in and powers of regulation and control 

 of said lands and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national 

 defense, and international affairs, all of which shall be paramount to, but shall not be deemed to include, 

 proprietary rights of ownership, or the rights of management, administration, leasing, use, and 

 development of the lands and natural resources which are specifically recognized, confirmed, established, 

 and vested in and assigned to the respective States . . . ^ " 



We have been unable to find any case law or administrative interpretations of the section quoted 

 iininediately above, but would like to make two observations about the section. The effect of United 

 States V. California was to invest the United States with a proprietary interest, to which Mr. Justice 

 Frankfurter aUuded in his dissent.^ ' This seems to have been confirmed in United States v. Louisiana,^^ 

 where the Court stated: 



Since the Act concededly did not impair the validity of the California, Louisiana, and Texas cases, which 

 are admittedly applicable to all coastal States, this case draws in question only the geographic extent to 

 which the statute ceded to the States the federal rights established by those decisions. . . 



While the ownership of certain lands within state boundaries has been held to be an inseparable attribute 

 of the political sovereignty guaranteed equally to all States, . . . the geographic extent of those 

 boundaries, and thus of the lands owned, clearly has nothing to do with political equality. A fortiori this 

 is true in the case of maritime boundaries beyond low-water mark, since, except as granted by Congress, 

 the States do not own the lands beneath the marginal seas. [Emphasis added.] 



Regulatory authority over natural resources in the navigable waters within the seaward boundaries of 

 the States has not been completely relinquished by the Congress, and could be asserted if necessary to 

 do so in the best interest of rehabilitation of the U.S. fisheries. The "proprietary rights of ownership" 

 and "title" to natural resources granted by the Submerged Lands Act, as they pertain to migratory 

 species of fish, are subject to the limitations previously discussed regarding title to animals /erae naturae, 

 which may be part of the meaning of the phrase "if any it has" in 43 U.S.C. 1311 (b), where Congress 

 relinquished "all right, title, and interest of the United States, if any it has, in and to aU said. . . natural 

 resources."^ ^ This also includes relinquishment of the public trust in which the State holds "title" to 

 animals ferae naturae once a State permits the shipping and sale of such resources in interstate 

 commerce.^'' Patently, the Congress has not relinquished the power to regulate interstate commerce in 

 recognizing, confirming, establishing, and vesting proprietary rights of ownership and rights of 

 management over such natural resources in the States. Congress could assert regulatory powers pursuant 

 to the Commerce Clause if it foimd that the failure of the States to manage the marine fisheries imposed 

 an undue burden upon interstate commerce. 



F. Conclusions and Summary 



Summing up the discussion of the power of the Federal Government to participate in the regulation 

 of United States fisheries, we conclude (1) that when enabled pursuant to a treaty, the Federal 

 Government has clear authority to regulate fisheries, which authority would supervene any State laws on 

 the subject, and which could be exercised exclusively if the Congress were so to choose and (2) that tiie 

 commerce clause could be invoked to warrant Federal regulation or participation in regulation of species 

 shipped and sold in interstate commerce. 



^"67 Stat. 32, 43 U.S.C. 1314. 



^*332 U.S. 19,45(1946). 



^^363 U.S. 1,7,77(1959). 



^^67 Stat. 31,43 U.S.C. 1311(b). 



^'* a. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. y. Louisiana, 278 U.S. 1 (1928); roo/ner v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 335 (1948). 



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