of the States (such as tJie Commercial Fisheries Research and Development Act, and the Anadromous 

 and Great Lakes Fisheries Act) be placed in the control of the marine fisheries commissions, to be 

 expended in accordance with national fisheries policies and priorities estabhshed by the Federal 

 Government, and in accordance with the priorities, policies, and procedures of the marine fisheries 

 commissions; 



g. The States would have primary responsibility for developing plans and programs for expenditure 

 of Federal funds, in accordance with the National fisheries poUcies and priorities established by the 

 Federal Government. The States would submit to the marine fisheries commissions their plans for 

 regulation, conservation, development, and utilization of marine fisheries, which plans would include 

 identification of institutional barriers inhibiting efficient development and use of the fisheries, and the 

 steps proposed to be taken by the State to remove them. Should the State change its plan without 

 marine fisheries commission approval, or fail to comply with the provisions of the plan, the marine 

 fisheries commission would be authorized to withhold payments to the State; 



h. Administrative procedures for enforcement of State plans in accordance with marine fisheries 

 commission and Federal poUcies and priorities would be provided. It would provide further that if the 

 States fail to act to make plans for the regulation, conservation, development, and utiUzation of its 

 marine fisheries, the Secretary of the Interior, working in cooperation with the marine fisheries 

 commission, could do so, and the Secretary could take necessary steps to enforce those regulations. 



5. Discussion of Alternative Institutional Arrangements 



a. Under the current mechanisms for dealing with fisheries problems, little can be done to promote 

 management of U.S. fisheries on sound scientific, economic, and legal bases. Many of the State 

 institutional barriers that inhibit sound fishing practices, also inhibit action by the States to correct the 

 situations. Almost all State fisheries administrators to whom we have spoken have indicated both an 

 awareness of the problems confronting commercial fisheries and a desire to correct them, but under the 

 present mechanisms are unable to overcome the political and other institutional barriers in their States 

 that inhibit change. The alternatives presented above provide a stronger Federal role, initially through 

 economic incentives brought to bear upon the States through either the marine fisheries commissions or 

 the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries. Two of the alternatives go beyond economic incentives to assert a 

 potential Federal regulation of the fisheries if administrative procedures provide insufficient incentive to 

 the States to move toward sound fisheries management. 



b. The institutional arrangements suggested here presuppose initially that the changes required could 

 be accompUshed without divesting the States of the regulatory authority that they have traditionally 

 exercised over marine fisheries. Under the regional compact, the principal role of the marine fisheries 

 commissions would be that of economic development and would not place any regulatory authority in 

 the marine fisheries commissions. Rather, through the exercise of other powers, it would be the 

 purpose of the regional compact to encourage and facilitate change by the States, with the sanction of 

 withholding Federal funds for failure to effect sound fisheries management poUcies and programs. Both 

 the Federal-State partnership and the regional compact with enforcement powers assume that economic 

 pressure may be insufficient to effect the necessary changes, and that only the ultimate sanction of 

 Federal preemption of regulation of the marine fisheries will provide the necessary power-incentive for 

 the States to begin to remove the institutional barriers inhibiting the sound management of marine 

 fisheries. 



c. Under the two regional compacts suggested, substantial Federal funds for fisheries would be placed 

 in the control of the strengthened marine fisheries commissions. In order to protect and promote the 

 interests of the United States under such arrangements, the Federal Goverimient must be a signatory 

 member of the marine fisheries compacts, with full voting rights, and an ultimate veto if it disagrees with 

 programs proposed before the marine fisheries commissions. Basic to the operations of the marine 

 fisheries commissions under the regional compacts would be the responsibilities of the member States, 



VII-87 



