investment and apply only to the stock of fish 

 affected by its investment. They point out that 

 none of this investment has been made in Alaskan 

 rivers and streams, that they exploit only Alaskan 

 spawned salmon on the high seas and that about 

 95 percent of the weight of this fish is gained 

 while they are beyond the territorial waters of the 

 United States. They argue, too, that they have by 

 now borne part of the expense of salmon conserva- 

 tion by acceding to the abstention doctrine for 

 more than 10 years and should be entitled to some 

 share of the catch. They deny that because a 

 coastal State prevents its fishermen from depleting 

 a resource, it has an equitable claim to exclusive 

 access to the resource, particularly when multi- 

 national conservation efforts are possible. Japan 

 also maintains that evidence based upon scientific 

 research does not indicate that more extensive 

 exploitation of the salmon will not provide a 

 substantial increase in yield that can be sustained 

 year after year and therefore that the basic 

 condition for the appUcation of abstention under 

 the Convention is not satisfied. 



Finally, the abstention doctrine in the North 

 Pacific may be jeopardized by the entry into the 

 Convention area of the Soviet Union, South Korea 

 and other nations which are not parties to the 

 Convention. The Convention itself recognizes the 

 inapplicability of the abstention doctrine to "any 

 stock of fish which is harvested in greater part by a 

 country or countries not party to the Conven- 

 tion." While the Soviet Union so far has demon- 

 strated a tacit willingness to leave alone the salmon 

 and halibut fisheries from which the Japanese have 

 agreed to abstain, it is free to change its position at 

 any time. Moreover, South Korea is participating 

 in the salmon fisheries of the North Pacific. The 

 resulting unfairness to the Japanese is apparent. 



The impasse which has been reached in connec- 

 tion with Japanese proposals to eliminate the 

 abstention doctrine reveals the difficulties that will 

 be encountered in any attempt to replace it. 

 However, it also reveals that abstention is not a 

 viable principle in the long run. In many regions of 

 the world, nations with distant-water fishing fleets 

 are rapidly expanding their activities into some of 

 the world's most valuable fisheries contiguous to 

 the coasts of countries which need the protein but 

 lack the technical and financial capacity to partici- 

 pate in these fisheries. These countries fear that. 



by the time they have attained the necessary 

 competence and capital, the abstention doctrine 

 may bar them from these fisheries or be used as 

 justification for admitting them on unfavorable 

 terms. It should not be surprising, therefore, that 

 these developing countries oppose the doctrine— as 

 do all newcomers to a particular fishery— as one 

 that seeks to preserve an inequitable status quo. It 

 should be pointed out, too, that in time the 

 United States itself may be a new entrant into the 

 fisheries of many areas of the world. 



As aquaculture progresses and capital and labor 

 are invested to cultivate particular living resources 

 of the sea artificially, there may be a place for the 

 abstention doctrine to protect the investor's right 

 of exclusive access to these resources. 



c. Limited Power of Fishery Commissions The 



fishery commissions-the administrative agencies 

 created by the fishery conventions to carry out 

 their objectives-generally have only the power to 

 make recommendations which must be accepted 

 by all the States Parties to become effective. The 

 Agreement between the United States and Canada 

 respecting the sockeye and pink salmon fisheries is 

 an exception to this general rule. Commission 

 action to adjust emergency orders or the closing or 

 opening of fishing periods and areas during any 

 fishing season is not subject to approval of the two 

 Governments. To become effective, however, such 

 action must be voted for by at least two of the 

 three Commissioners of each Government. The 

 fact that the two governments need not formally 

 approve such action is probably not significant 

 because enforcement responsibilities under the 

 agreement in question are vested in the national 

 fishery agency of Canada and the Department of 

 Fisheries of the State of Washington. Neither 

 government is likely to enforce a Commission 

 action of which it disapproves and the Commission 

 will know, informally, whether its action will be 

 approved and enforced before it takes it. 



The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of 

 the Living Resources of the Sea attempts to 

 overcome the difficulties that stem from requiring 

 unanimous approval of the States parties to an 

 international fishery convention before a conserva- 

 tion regulation can become effective. In the first 

 place, it forces consideration of the need for 

 conservation of a fish stock if only one State 



VIII-51 



