participating in the fishery, or a non-participating 

 coastal State, or, under some circumstances, a 

 non-coastal non-participating State, insists upon it. 

 If agreement does not result from such considera- 

 tion, the Convention authorizes any such State to 

 invoke the dispute-settlement machinery it estab- 

 hshes. Furthermore, the coastal State is authorized 

 unHateraUy to adopt non-discriminatory conserva- 

 tion measures which are binding upon foreign 

 fishermen, subject to the same dispute-settlement 

 machinery. Decisions of the special commission 

 created to settle the disputes are binding on the 

 States concerned. 



The Convention provides the means to bolster 

 all existing fishery conventions. Its procedure 

 could be employed to prevent depletion of certain 

 fish stocks which are not subject to conservation 

 regulations until such time as a new fishery 

 convention is negotiated. It could also be invoked 

 if a State Party to an existing fishery convention 

 refuses to accept a commission recommendation 

 or a State which is not a Party enters the 

 convention area and disregards the existing con- 

 servation regulations. The coastal State could then 

 act unilaterally and could probably take effective 

 action to enforce its conservation regulations. 



Unfortunately, however, the Convention has 

 not been accepted by all the important fishing 



States of the world and it is very doubtful that it 

 has been accepted by a sufficient number of them 

 to have become part of international law. It is 

 difficult to say, therefore, that a coastal State is 

 clearly justified to invoke the Convention as the 

 source of its authority to impose its conservation 

 measures upon a State which is not a party to the 

 Convention. The refusal of any important fishing 

 State to cooperate in a multinational conservation 

 effort, although it participates in the fishery 

 affected by that effort, remains a threat to the 

 conservation and economic objectives of inter- 

 national fisheries management. 



4. Administrative Organization and Budget 



Table 1 ^ ° sets forth the estimated expenditures 

 for fiscal year 1969 of the fishery commissions to 

 which the United States is a party, together with 

 the United States contribution to these expendi- 

 tures. 



In all, these commissions are expected to spend 

 approximately $3,313,700 in fiscal 1969. Of this 

 total, the United States will contribute 

 $2,064,000, of which $1,031,000 will go to the 

 work of the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission. In 



30 



Based upon data supplied by National Council on 



Marine Resources and Engineering Development. 

 Table 1 



VIII-52 



