Pacific Ocean. The other States Parties to the 

 Convention hold contrary scientific opinions. 



Equally serious, many States Parties to fishery 

 conventions or to the regional fishery councils of 

 the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organi- 

 zation lack the necessary scientific personnel or 

 the resources to employ them. They are unable, 

 therefore, to do the research required to estabhsh 

 the scientific basis for the conservation work of 

 the fishery commission or council in question. Yet 

 the commission or council has no staff of its own 

 to do the work. 



The important contribution which an inde- 

 pendent staff can make to a fishery commission is 

 demonstrated by the experience of the Inter- 

 national Pacific Halibut Commission, the Inter- 

 national Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission and 

 the Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission, 

 each of which is adequately financed for this 

 purpose. However, the distant-water fishing na- 

 tions may not be eager to emulate the example of 

 the latter Commission and pay most of the cost of 

 supporting an independent and neutral staff for an 

 international commission to which the coastal 

 non-contributing nations belong and have an equal 

 voice and vote.^^ On the other hand, the latter 

 nations will have no confidence in any organiza- 

 tion in which they do not have an equal voice and 

 vote. 



5. Enforcement 



The problem of enforcing the conservation 

 measures agreed upon by the States parties to a 

 fishery convention is aggravated by the fact that 

 not all the nations which participate in the fishery 

 in question are parties to the Convention. For 

 example, at least three non-member countries now 

 participate in the fisheries of the Northwest 

 Atlantic,^ ^ and the Soviet Union and South Korea 

 have entered the convention area of the North 

 Pacific. 



Other difficulties abound. No Convention has 

 adopted a system of international enforcement 



See Chapman, The Theory and Practice of Inter- 

 national Fisheries Commissions and Bodies 35, 39, Paper 

 Presented to Symposium on International Fishery Prob- 

 lems, Gulf and Caribbean Fisheries Institute, San Juan, 

 Puerto Rico, Nov. 15, 1967. 



33 



Report of the U.N. Secretary General, Marine 

 Science and Technology: Survey and Proposals, Annex 

 XII, at 18 (1968). 



which, at the least, entrusts the task of investiga- 

 tion to the fishery commission itself and provides 

 it with the means to do the job. When the 

 International Convention for the Regulation of 

 Whaling was amended in 1963 to authorize the 

 International Whaling Commission to adopt regula- 

 tions fixing "methods of inspection," it was 

 expected that the Conmiission would estabhsh an 

 international corps of neutral observers, responsi- 

 ble to and paid by the Commission and that one 

 such observer, not a national of the country of 

 registration, would be assigned by the Commission 

 to each factory ship on a whaling expedition.^ ^ 

 But no such international inspection system was 

 inaugurated and the agreement to estabhsh it has 

 expired. 



The enforcement provision of ICNAF is the 

 weakest type. Under it, the States Parties agree "to 

 take such action as may be necessary to make 

 effective the provisions of this Convention and to 

 implement any proposals" which all the interested 

 States have accepted. This leaves it to each State 

 Party to enforce the provisions of the Convention, 

 and any Commission regulations implementing 

 them, against its own nationals and fishing vessels. 

 While a system of international enforcement has 

 been recommended for ICNAF, it has not yet been 

 instituted. 



The Conventions involving the North Pacific 

 Fur Seals, High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific 

 Ocean, Pacific Salmon Fisheries and Pacific 

 Halibut contain stronger enforcement provisions. 

 They generally provide that authorized officials of 

 any State Party may board, search and seize the 

 vessel of any other State Party which they have 

 reasonable grounds to believe has violated the 

 provisions of the appUcable Convention or Com- 

 mission regulations. However, they must dehver 

 the seized vessel and the arrested crew to the 

 authorized officials of the State Party to which the 

 offending vessel and persons belong, and only that 

 State Party may try the alleged offense and impose 

 penalties. 



Under the Convention on the High Seas Fish- 

 eries of the North Pacific Ocean, furthermore, the 

 States Parties which engage in the fisheries are 



Agreement Concerning International Observer 

 Scheme for Factory Ships Engaged in Pelagic Whaling in 

 the Antarctic, Oct. 28, 1963, 15th Report of Inter- 

 national Whaling Commission, at 23. 



VlII-54 



