unlikely to catch cod and haddock outside the 

 areas in question. The Working Group did not 

 think these problems were insuperable.** 



Relevant data are already available to determine 

 the live weight and the species of fish used for fish 

 meal and to distinguish between fish meal made of 

 whole fish and that made of the residue of 

 processed fish.*' However, there is no way to 

 check up on the quantity of fish below marketable 

 size which is discarded at sea. Though the Working 

 Group recognized the desirability of including 

 discarded fish in any catch quota, because the 

 removal of these small fish, which have a high rate 

 of mortality when returned to the sea, has a 

 greater adverse effect upon the future stock than 

 the capture of the same weight of larger fish, the 

 group recommended against inclusion because of 

 the insuperable enforcement problem.* * 



Finally, to provide an incentive to comply, 

 deviations by any nation from its catch quota for 

 one year should be taken into consideration in 

 fixing its quota for the next year. Thus, the 

 succeeding quota should be reduced by an amount 

 equal to 110 percent of any excess or 50 percent 

 of any shortfall.*' Furthermore, any nation which 

 exceeds its quota in any year should be required to 

 pay to all the other participating nations an 

 amount equal to the average market value of the 

 stock overfished by that nation during that year. 



4. Is It the Best Way To Limit Fishing Effort? 



The fixing of national catch quotas does not of 

 itself guarantee that each nation participating in 

 the fishery will enjoy the economic advantages to 

 be gained from reducing fishing effort. That 

 depends upon whether each nation curtails its 

 fishing effort and the manner in which it does so. 

 If it does not curtail its effort by restricting the 

 number of fishing units to the minimum required 

 to take its quota on a full-time basis, it will 

 dissipate its potential gains. Thus, for example, the 

 ICNAF Working Group's study of the United 



66 



68 

 69c 



Ibid. 



'^Ibid 



Ibid. 



States operations on Georges Bank haddock re- 

 vealed that if the number of fishing days per vessel 

 is reduced by 30 percent, leaving unchanged the 

 number of vessels and manpower devoted to the 

 fishery, only very small long-term benefit would 

 be achieved by catch quotas and short-term losses 

 would be inflicted on both vessel owner and crew. 

 If on the other hand, the input of capital and labor 

 is adjusted to the reduced number of fishing days 

 to allow full utilization of the remaining fishing 

 capacity, an immediate and substantial improve- 

 ment of the economic situation is certain and in 

 the long run, as indicated earlier, this industry 

 would become highly remunerative .'° 



It may also be true that unless each nation 

 participating in the fishery rationalizes the fishing 

 effort it devotes to catching its quota, the whole 

 quota system may be jeopardized. Under the best 

 of conditions, national catch quotas for all the cod 

 and haddock fisheries of the North Atlantic will 

 not insure against the possibility of excessive 

 pressure on individual fish populations. But if 

 some countries restrict the number of their fishing 

 units to the minimum required to take their quotas 

 over prolonged periods of time, while others make 

 no effort to restrict entry into the fishery and 

 exhaust their quotas in much shorter periods, all 

 nations participating in the fishery would be under 

 pressure to concentrate on readily accessible loca- 

 tions.' ' The result might be overfishing of separ- 

 able sub-groups of the fish populations involved, 

 precisely the undesirable biological effect of short 

 fishiag seasons produced by an overall catch limit 

 alone.' ^ 



Furthermore, unless each nation rationalizes its 

 effort to catch its quota, there may be great 

 pressure upon each to violate its quota restric- 

 tions.'^ 



It might be suggested that this problem be met 

 by fixing a separate overall catch limit and 

 national catch quota for each stock of cod and 

 haddock. However, it seems generally agreed that 

 it is very difficult, if not impossible, to enforce a 

 system of regulation based upon the needs of 



70 

 71 



See ibid. The Working Group suggested that there 

 should be a credit of 90 per cent of any shortfall, but it is 

 difficult to see why a nation should be credited in a 

 succeeding year for failing to catch its quota. 



72 



Id at 4. 



Economic Aspects of Fishery Management, at 8. 



Ibid 



'^Note by the United Kingdom Commissioners on the 

 Regulation of Fishing Effort, supra note 55, at 5. 



VIII-61 



