exploitation until such time as the need arose to 

 accommodate new countries. New entrants might 

 also gain access to the fisheries by purchasing all or 

 part of the quota of an existing participant. 



Whether this approach to the problem succeeds 

 will depend upon the number of new entrants and 

 the economic impact of their entry upon existing 

 participants. It is impossible to predict this 

 number or impact. 



As an alternative, it has been suggested that as 

 economic gains are realized from the proposed 

 quota system, compensation should be provided 

 for those countries which undertake to abstain 

 from the North Atlantic fisheries. The difficulty 

 with this suggestion is that all the countries in the 

 world other than the existing participants are 

 potential abstainers and recipients of compensa- 

 tion. It would not be practical to determine the 

 amount of compensation that should be paid them 

 or how that amount should be divided among 

 them, nor would the amounts received, in all 

 probability, be sufficient to induce the potentially 

 serious new entrants to abstain. 



The panel faced a similar problem in connection 

 with its reconmiended framework for exploring 

 and exploiting the mineral resources of the deep 

 seas and the solution suggested in that instance 

 might prove to be feasible here. A portion 

 (specified by ICNAF) of the net economic gain 

 realized from the proposed quota system might be 

 collected by ICNAF and paid into the Inter- 

 national Fund recommended in Chapter III. The 

 efficacy of this alternative would depend upon the 

 extent to which it actually induced nations not 

 participating in the fisheries to refrain from 

 seeking entry. Consideration should be given to 

 the possibility of a new international convention 

 requiring abstention from fisheries governed by 

 quota systems such as that proposed for the North 

 Atlantic fisheries, in return for which payments to 

 an International Fund would be made. 



b. The Position of Some Coastal States The fish- 

 ermen of some coastal States bordering on the 

 Northwest Atlantic may be unable to shift their 

 excess capacity to other fisheries and may, there- 

 fore, present a special problem. The panel has 

 already recommended that if it becomes necessary 

 to close subareas of the North Atlantic which are 

 threatened by overfishing, these small inshore 



fishermen— of Newfoundland, Iceland and 

 Greenland— should be excepted. 



However, it may be necessary to go further to 

 protect them. In its Resolution on "Special Situa- 

 tions Relating to Coastal Fisheries", the 1958 

 Geneva Convention recommended that preferen- 

 tial treatment should be given to the coastal State 

 "whose people are over-whelmingly dependent 

 upon coastal fisheries for their livelihood or 

 economic development" or "whose coastal popula- 

 tion depend primarily on coastal fisheries for the 

 animal protein of its diet and whose fishing 

 methods are mainly limited to local fishing from 

 small boats."''' 



The panel accepts the principle of this Resolu- 

 tion and recommends that the needs of these 

 coastal States should be given special consideration 

 when national catch quotas are allocated. 



Whether a coastal State bordering on the North 

 Atlantic or a region thereof is "overwhelmingly 

 dependent upon coastal fisheries" might be deter- 

 mined by the percentage of its gross income 

 accounted for by actual coastal fishing operations, 

 fish processing and supplying the various sections 

 of the fishing industry. Such a coastal State or 

 region would be eUgible for special consideration if 

 all these sections of the fishing industry accounted 

 for a given percentage (15 to 20 percent) of its 

 gross income. The exact percentage, of course, 

 would be a matter for negotiation. 



The "special consideration" to which the 

 coastal State or region would then be entitled 

 would be the allocation of a catch quota not less 

 than that which would leave its percentage of the 

 catch equal to its average percentage during a 

 reasonable number of years prior to the allocation. 

 However, this percentage need not be determined 

 by a rigid principle; it, too, may be negotiated. 



The concern of the United States for coastal 

 States which are developing countries should also 

 be demonstrated by increasing United States 

 efforts, bilaterally as well as multUaterally, to aid 

 them in improving their fisheries capabilities. In 

 fiscal 1966, the Agency for International Develop- 

 ment committed only $100,000 for fisheries; in 

 fiscal 1967, the amount committed increased to 

 $2.7 milhon and in fiscal 1968, to $7.1 million, of 



Resolution VI, 2 Official Records of the Geneva 

 Convention on the Law of the Sea 144, U.N. Doc 

 A/CONF. 13L.56. 



VIII-64 



