(c) The trust territories of the South Pacific would be practically impossible to divide. 



(2) The Soviet Union would get virtually nothing from this "median line" or "national lake" 

 proposal, other than a small shce of the Northwest Pacific, the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean.^ The 

 U.S.S.R. is not likely, therefore, to accept it. Other coastal States which would not gain much from this 

 alternative are also likely to reject it. 



(3) This alternative would not be acceptable to the 20 member-States of the United Nations that do 

 not have coastlines. 



The fact is that at some point, long before one reaches mid-ocean, the coastal State . . . has no claim 

 greater than that of any other State. Other nations would not see why the coastal States should enjoy 

 the economic and political advantages that exclusive control of these minerals would bring. * 



(4) While the United States would get a vast section of the North Pacific, its freedom to operate in all 

 oceans would be severely restricted. United States firms would have to deal with a multitude of coastal 

 States, thereby subjecting their investments to the risk of future expropriation and their revenues to 

 increasing royalties and taxes. 



(5) In time, there is the danger that this alternative may encourage claims of exclusive coastal State 

 authority over the superjacent waters and the fish therein, the surface waters and the air above them, to 

 the detriment of American interests in the freedom of the seas.^ 



(6) "Even if— as is indeed unlikely— this [alternative] does not lead coastal nations to claim full 

 sovereignty over the areas allotted to them, the uses of the sea and seabed for other purposes would be 

 curtailed. Nations that have control for purposes of exploiting resources would need rights to pohce and 

 protect their installations, as they have on the continental shelf today. They will begin to impinge on 

 scientific research, fishing, new uses of the seabed for transportation, recreation, sojourn. The United 

 States would be particularly concerned lest such a proposal effectively forecloses the use of most of the 

 oceans for military purposes."* 



In short, to divide the mineral resources of the seabed and subsoil underlying the high seas among the 

 coastal States of the world would not be consistent with American objectives in the oceans. It would not 

 contribute to the national security or welfare of the United States or to international order or welfare. 



II. RECOGNIZE ANY STATE'S CLAIM TO PERMANENT, EXCLUSIVE ACCESS TO THE 

 MINERAL RESOURCES OF PARTICULAR AREAS OF THE BED OF THE DEEP SEAS AND ITS 

 SUBSOIL WHICH THAT STATE IS THE FIRST TO DISCOVER AND EXPLOIT* 



a. The following arguments may be adduced in favor of this alternative: 



(1) It rejects the "median-hue" or "national-lake" approach of the first alternative. 



(2) International recognition of such national claims would carry with it the right of each State to 

 protect its nationals and other lessees, their installations, equipment and minerals and to create a 

 reasonable safety zone around their operations. Under these circumstances, American private enterprise 

 would feel secure in proceeding with exploration and exploitation. 



Christy, supra note 4, at 14. 



Henkin, supra note 38 to Chapter 3, at 61. 



See Craven, supra note 83 to Chapter 3, at 34-35; Christy, supra note 4, at 14; Chapman, Problems of the North 

 Pacific and Atlantic Fisheries, Annual Meeting, Fisheries Council of Canada, Montreal, May 10, 1967, at 2; Burke, A 

 Negative View of Proposals for United Nations Ownership of Ocean Mineral Resources, American Bar Association 

 National Institute on Marine Resources, June 8, 1967, at II, 10-11; Frosch, supra note 84 to Chapter 3, at 8; and Zeni, 

 supra note 83 to Chapter 3, at 83. All these government officials and writers agree that the danger adverted to in the 

 text is real. 



Henkin, supra note 38 to Chapter 3, at 62. 



This alternative has been advocated most forcefully by Northcutt Ely, The Administration of Mineral Resources 

 Underlying the High Seas, American Bar Association National Institute on Marine Resources, Long Beach, California, 

 June 8, 1967. 



Vin-92 



