(3) Motivated by economic, military, scientific, technological, prestige and other political considera- 

 tions and spurred by this alternative, the nations of the world would compete to explore and exploit the 

 mineral resources of the ocean floor. This competition would lead to the earliest possible exploitation of 

 these resources, to the benefit of all mankind. 



(4) This alternative is the best legal-political framework that can be devised until such time as the 

 major powers discover minerals in submarine areas which are so close to each other that friction is 

 threatened, or until the major powers are able to produce marine minerals in such profusion as to require 

 an international system of control to balance world production against world demand. At that time, it 

 may be expected, new international law can and would be made with the requisite speed, either by 

 unilateral action, multUateral agreement or United Nations Convention.'" 



b. Nevertheless, the panel concludes that the reasons for rejecting this alternative are compelling. 



(1) This alternative will favor the wealthy and technologically advanced nations and prejudice the 

 less developed countries of the world, contrary to the President's declaration that our ocean policy 

 should seek to benefit all mankind. For this reason, it is not a sufficient answer, in our view, to say that 

 the less developed nations may share the benefits by offering their flags as flags of convenience to 

 operators seeking to explore and exploit the mineral resources of the deep seas.' ' Whether to fly a flag 

 of convenience is a decision made, in the first instance, by the nationals of the technologically advanced 

 State, not the less developed country. Moreover, the technologically advanced State has the authority to 

 forbid its nationals to acquire such flags of convenience; it may also have the incentive to do so because 

 "sovereign rights" to the mineral resources of the deep seas constitute a much more important prize than 

 the attribution of national character to ships. 



Thus, whatever benefits may flow to a less developed nation from a decision to use its flag for mineral 

 resource exploration and exploitation will come to it not as a matter of right but as a matter of someone 

 else's self-interest. 



(2) This alternative may impel a race between nations, if not private entrepreneurs, to appropriate 

 vast areas of the bed of the deep seas and its subsoil for strategic, poUtical or economic reasons, often 

 without regard for cost considerations. Such a race would engender international conflict, contrary to 

 the objectives proclaimed by President Johnson. 



(3) Again, there is the danger that possession of the right of permanent, exclusive access to the 

 mineral resources of particular areas of the deep seas may tempt the exploiting State to extend its 

 sovereignty over these areas in all other respects. Even if this temptation is resisted, the right of such 

 permanent, exclusive access would give that State the "opportunity and authority to interfere 

 substantially with free uses of these ocean areas.' ^ 



III. ADD TO ALTERNATIVE i OR II CERTAIN "INTERNATIONAL" FEATURES 



To make alternative I or II more acceptable to the nations of the world, it may be suggested that 

 every State engaging in exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources of the deep seas, under the 

 alternative chosen, should be required to pay a royalty or tax on the gross revenues or net income from 

 the operations of its Ucensees; the proceeds from the royalty or tax should be used for agreed upon 

 international purposes.' ^ Alternative II might be accompanied by provision for an international registry 

 of claims and an international body to administer the registry and settle disputes.' " 



This suggestion, however, does not obviate remaining serious objections to these alternatives. It would 

 still leave coastal States under alternative I, and the technologically advanced States under alternative II, 

 with the principal economic and poHtical advantages to be derived from control of the mineral resources 



'°/dat9. 



III. ai y . 



This argument is made by Burke, supra note 7, at 11,4. 

 Henkin, supra note 38 to Chapter 3, at 63. 



See, for example, id. at 62 

 '"W. at 64. 



Vni-93 



