Soviet Union and the United States. The United States should not forego such uses except in the context 

 of a broader agreement for arms control and disarmament. 



d. A United Nations agency monopoly. Under the comprehensive CSOP proposal, the United Nations 

 agency which holds "ownership rights" to the marine resources might itself elect to engage in the 

 exploitation of the resources, contracting for the use of the necessary machinery and equipment and the 

 services of necessary personnel. It might thus exclude all States and their nationals from engaging in such 

 exploitation other than as contractors. 



The panel concludes that such a monopoly would be undesirable. It is not the most efficient way to 

 encourage the development of the ocean's resources. It would force the United Nations agency to 

 compete, in marketing the resources in question, with private entrepreneurs and state-traders on land. 

 Clearly, it would not help to attain the objective of the Marine Resources and Engineering Development 

 Act to encourage "private investment enterprise in exploration, technological development, marine 

 commerce, and economic utilization of the resources of the marine environment." 



For the same reasons, the panel would oppose such an international monopoly even if it were not put 

 in the hands of a United Nations agency but in an international consortium independent of the United 

 Nations, whether entirely intergovernmental, entirely private or mixed. 



V. GIVE THE UNITED NATIONS, IN THE NAME OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, 

 "TITLE" TO THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE BED OF THE HIGH SEAS AND ITS 

 SUBSOIL BEYOND THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 



A proposal for United Nations control has been made which would obviate the objections advanced 

 above to the more inclusive CSOP recommendations.^ ' Under this proposal, the United Nations would 

 take "title" only to the mineral resources of the deep seas. However, "title" would give the designated 

 United Nations agency authority only to prohibit all exploration and exploitation of the mineral 

 resources of the deep seas except by its prior license and to auction to the highest bidder such hcenses, 

 i.e., the exclusive rights to explore and exploit specified mineral resources in particular areas of the deep 

 seas. It would not give the agency itself authority to explore and exploit the mineral resources and 

 exclude all States and their nationals from engaging in such exploration and exploitation. 



Revenues from such United Nations licensing would be used for internationally agreed purposes— e.g., 

 to combat protein malnutrition all over the world— but not to give the United Nations an independent 

 source of income for its general purposes. 



a. The arguments for such an international legal-poUtical framework are many. 



(1) In the first place, it would avoid the difficulties of the alternatives previously considered. 



(2) It would accomplish the prime objective of any international framework; to prevent a race 

 among nations to claim the bed of the deep seas which might interfere with other uses of the seas and 

 provoke controversy, tension, and conflict. 



(3) It would raise revenues from the exploitation of the mineral resources of the deep seas that 

 would be used for the benefit of aO mankind. 



(4) It would promote "a more integrated world system governed in such a way that a general public 

 interest can be estabhshed and made the basis for global resources policies."^* 



(5) It would protect the investments of exploring and exploiting States and private entrepreneurs 

 because the United Nations agency would be able to assure licenses for a sufficiently large area and a 

 sufficiently long time to make possible an economically efficient and profitable operation. American 

 private entrepreneurs would have an opportunity under this framework to explore and exploit the 



The proposal that follows is essentially that of Christy, supra note 4. See also Christy, A Social Scientist Writes to 

 the International Lawyer on Economic Criteria for Rules Governing the Exploitation of Deep Sea Minerals, 2 The 

 International Lawyer 224 (1968). The arguments in favor of the proposal are also largely Mr. Christy's. 



Cheever, The Role of International Organizations in Ocean Development 3, The Ohio State University, 

 Mershon-Camegie Endowment Conference on Law, Organization and Security in the Use of the Oceans, October 6, 

 1967. 



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