(4) The alternative is unfair to non-coastal States and to States with distant-water fishing fleets which 

 possess the freedom to fish on the high seas, beyond the 1 2-mile limits, under existing international law 

 and should not have to pay tribute to coastal States for continuing to exercise this freedom. 



(5) Certain species of fish roam beyond the continental shelves and their conservation and economic 

 exploitation will require international cooperation which may not be forthcoming so readily if the 

 coastal States will be the predominant beneficiaries thereof. 



II. GIVE THE UNITED NATIONS, IN THE NAME OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, 

 TITLE TO THE LIVING RESOURCES OF THE HIGH SEAS BEYOND THE 12-MILE LIMIT 



It will be recalled that this proposal was originally made by the Commission to Study the 

 Organization of Peace and was endorsed by the United Nations Charter Commitee of the World Peace 

 Through Law Center.^ Under this proposal, a United Nations agency would be created to control and 

 administer these living resources. It would be empowered either (a) to operate the fisheries itself and "to 

 buy labor and capital in the cheapest markets and seU marine products in the dearest markets, returning 

 its 'profits' in kind or in money to the members of the international community,"' or (b) to auction to 

 the highest bidders licenses (exclusive rights) to exploit specified stocks of fish or specified areas of the 

 high seas and to use the proceeds from the auctions for agreed-upon international purposes.* 



a. The following arguments have been adduced in favor of these alternatives. 



(1) By operating the high seas fisheries as sole entrepreneur, the United Nations agency would be in a 

 position to maximize the economic return from their exploitation. Even if it adopted the 

 auction-bidding alternative, it would be able to limit the number of Ucenses put up for auction to that 

 which would maximize the economic return to all licensees. There would be the maximum incentive 

 under either alternative to encourage technical innovation in fishing gear and craft and research into 

 methods of maximizing fishery resources. 



(2) The United Nations agency would become the single conservation authority for high seas fisheries 

 and be able to assure against overfishing and consequent depletion of any species or stock. 



(3) The United Nations agency would have the resources to employ the technical and scientific 

 personnel needed to manage high seas fisheries effectively and, if it resorted to the auction-bidding 

 alternative, to enforce its hcense terms. 



(4) If accepted, it would induce coastal States to abandon claims to extended territorial seas and 

 exclusive fisheries zones. 



(5) It would solve the problem of new entrants which plagues existing international fishery 

 arrangements. Every nation would have a chance to participate in the fisheries anywhere in the 

 world— by offering the cheapest price for its capital and labor or the highest price for a fishing license. 

 And all nations would benefit from the "profits" of the United Nations agency. Thus, this alternative 

 would give practical effect to the principle that the living resources of the high seas are the common 

 property of all nations. 



b. The following arguments have been adduced against these alternatives: 



(1) All the stated advantages assume that the United Nations agency will act in a certain manner, but 

 there can be no guarantee that it will. To entrust any agency with a monopoly of the exploitation of the 

 living resources of the high seas is to run very great risks unwarranted by the needs of the existing 

 situation. 



See Appendix A. 



''Christy and Scott, The Common Wealth in Ocean Fisheries 2940 (1965). 



This alternative was suggested by Francis T. Christy, Jr. at the Second Annual Conference on the Law of the Sea, 

 Kingston, R.I. (June 26-29, 1967). 



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